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ABSTRACT   
AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE RIO GRANDE IN THE PANAMA 
CANAL ZONE, 1521 —1950 
Francisco Javier Bonilla 
April 15, 2016 
This thesis is an examination of the history of environmental change in the 
defunct Rio Grande river valley in the former Panama Canal Zone.  By mining secondary 
sources and engineering records, this study provides a narrative of the historic river’s role 
in the formation of the so-called interoceanic corridor through the isthmus of Panama 
from 1521 to 1950. More importantly, however, as a case study of river histories in Latin 
American environmental history, this understudied, Pacific-draining river illustrates how 
culture and non-human nature made Panama’s strategic transit region into a loci for 
material flows over time.  
The Rio Grande played a vital role in the establishment of the Spanish colonial 
mule road during the colonial period. The nineteenth century ushered in the 
industrialization of the corridor, initiated with the construction of the Panama Railroad by 
American capitalists. Great advances in hydraulic technology led to the first serious canal 
building efforts in the area, with the French effort succumbing to an unyielding nature. 
The Panama Canal, built by the US government, led to a radical reorganization of the 
area’s socioecological systems. This thesis applies the concept of social metabolism and 
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In 1955, the Panama Canal Review, a magazine distributed to American 
personnel living in the Canal Zone, committed an early act of environmental journalism. 
It reported that a river in the Canal’s Watershed, the Río Grande, had flowed into the 
ground at a point in its hilly upper valley, in the narrowest point of the Great Continental 
Divide. Under the headline: “Zone's Historic Rio Grande Does Sudden Disappearing 
Act,” the Review called attention to this unusual event. To avoid confusion with the most 
famous Río Grande in the American social imaginary, it notes that this stream “isn't the 
shallow river bordering the southern part of Texas,” but the Rio Grande “explored 400 
years ago by the Spanish in their search of an overland communication between Atlantic 
and Pacific across… Panama.”1   
The Río Grande no longer exists in any form resembling its natural course. In the 
first decade of the twentieth century, U.S. engineers completely transformed the structure 
of its fluvial drainage system into what became known as the Panama Canal Watershed. 
The defunct river used to run from the central mountains of the isthmus toward the 
Pacific, taking the flow of a significant number of streams along the way. Across the 
Central American mountainous backbone just past the headwaters of the Río Chagres’s 
                                                          
1 “Zone’s Historic Rio Grande Does Sudden Disappearing Act,” Panama Canal Review, Aug. 5, 1955. 
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southernmost tributary began the meandering valley of the strategic Río Grande, snaking 
down the slope through alluvial lands south to Panama City. 
The river, at a point where it was just a sluggish mountain stream and still flowed 
naturally, burrowed in due to its bed being filled with rock from a nearby hill.2 The filling 
of the riverbed was “designed to stabilize the slopes of adjacent hills” and “raised the 
grade of the river 20 feet or more for a distance of several hundred feet.” The river 
reacted to an abrupt ecosystem disturbance, resulting from environmental management 
work connected to routine maintenance operations of the waterway.  The Review writer 
ascribed agency to the river, claiming the stream had not “taken calmly to this manmade 
innovation” and appeared to “prefer its original bed” instead by running underground.  If 
nothing else, this anecdotal event reveals the extent to which the operation of the Panama 
Canal, not just its initial construction, has entailed a continuous reworking of nature to 
ensure uninterrupted maritime traffic across the isthmus. It illustrates how space and 
environments have been historically, socially, and naturally produced. 
Moreover, the piece chronicles the role played by the Río Grande in the history of 
Panama as a land bridge and transoceanic route. Despite his or her legitimizing tone, the 
unnamed, de-facto environmental beat reporter for the Review demonstrated some 
knowledge of the river’s past. “The Rio Grande of the isthmus has been tied in closely 
with local progress since the beginning of recorded history,” the article claimed. It then 
briefly traced the role of the stream within the different routes of interoceanic 
communication that have existed through central Panama: the Spanish mule-road, the 
first Transcontinental Railroad, the failed French Canal, and the American Canal. Aware 
                                                          
2 The filling of the riverbed was “designed to stabilize the slopes of adjacent hills” and “has raised the 
grade of the river 20 feet or more for a distance of several hundred feet.” Ibid. 
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of the complications that characterized the provision of adequate sanitation and potable 
water during the Panama Canal’s construction, the writer even makes mention of the “old 
Rio Grande reservoir” in the river’s upper valley, “which once supplied water for the 
entire Pacific district between Culebra,” at the continental divide, “and Panama City.”3  
The Review’s report might also hint at another important element of the Río 
Grande’s history. Zonians, or American colonists in Panama, at least at mid-century, had 
a clear idea of what the nature their forefathers had allegedly conquered actually looked 
like. Thirty-five years after the opening of the canal when the piece was written, the Río 
Grande’s geomorphology had been irremediably damaged. However, the Zonian writer 
opted to neglect the fact that, had the stream remained aboveground seeking its natural 
course beyond the filling, it would have had to traverse a physiography radically altered 
by locks, dams, diversions, and dikes. The reporter used the old name of the river and 
valley to denote a meager surviving stream that did not resemble the historical Río 
Grande. The surviving stream’s unruly response to human induced environmental change 
does, however, highlight the basin’s storied history within transnational networks of 
flows. This thesis uses this documented moment of sudden fluvial change reported by the 
Review as a baseline from which to reconstruct the much longer history of ecological 
change affecting the environmental and social spaces of this forgotten river valley.  
Although a very unique case, the friction between local, transnational, and natural 
forces that drove change in central Panama’s ecosystems resonates with other places 
throughout the region and the world-system’s periphery, which proved easy targets for 
foreign capitalist and imperial schemes of resource use during the twentieth century. 
Most residents of Panama, a nation of just under four million, would be hard pressed to 




locate the historic watershed of the Río Grande or the estuarine mangrove forest at its 
mouth, which existed just west of the capital. Our understanding of the origins of present-
day issues and conflicts over freshwater access and availability— a political ecology 
issue with ties to the urbanization and expanding ecological footprint of the capital, 
Panama City— could benefit from a more comprehensive knowledge of the evolution of 
the landscapes reproducing inequalities at the edges of the Panama Canal. The 
construction and operation of the lock-based waterway articulates with the longer history 
of the Río Grande and, thus, with the history of Panama City and its hinterland, not to 
mention the history of the modern Republic of Panama.  
This study posits the Río Grande’s trajectory as a window through which to 
examine central Panama’s changing environment from a glocal perspective. The Rio 
Grande’s history has never been examined under the lens of environmental history. 
Framing this river valley’s changes through the prism of the region’s interoceanic 
corridor and water use allows a better understanding of how the isthmus’s transit tradition 
and the corresponding organization of human labor altered society’s relation to nature in 
situated and material ways. The co-evolution between Panama’s transit landscapes and 
society was a protracted process, one in which nature, technology, capital, and power 
came together to reshape the watershed, the communities therein, and Panama’s modern 
history.  
The long and protracted process of environmental change in the Rio Grande 
valley spans millennia; this thesis only surveys approximately the last six centuries of the 
defunct river’s environmental history in relation to social metabolism. With the arrival of 
the Spanish in the early sixteenth century, the transisthmian corridor in the isthmus’s 
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narrowest point was established as the ‘official’ imperial route, inserted within an early 
capitalist network of flows. This spatial arrangement of Panama’s population and 
productive activity was to persist until the twenty first century. The re-organization of the 
Rio Grande basin during the U.S. construction of the canal (1904 -14) stands out as one 
of the most significant and meaningful transformations deriving from the industrialization 
of interoceanic transit. This thesis will build upon secondary and primary sources, mostly 
engineering reports, to trace the material changes of the river and its basin in connection 
to the changing relationship between humans and the natural world on the isthmus. 
Adopting the prisms of human labor and water use can elucidate the material and cultural 
legacies of imperialism, and help illuminate how historical contexts altered landscapes in 















THE ISTHMIAN RIO GRANDE: HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THEORY 
 
Until recent decades, the historiography of the Panama Canal was infused with a 
‘triumphalist’ tone dating back to the construction era. American tropes about the 
construction of the canal had traditionally framed the narrative as a ‘conquest over 
nature,’ usually revolving around the taming of the formidable Rio Chagres in the 
Caribbean slope or the piercing of the Culebra mountain cut. As Panamanian historian 
Bonifacio Pereira Jimenez stated, “The history of Panama is, to a certain extent, the 
history of the Rio Chagres.”4 Pereira Jimenez was not mistaken as to the importance that 
the Río Chagres had for the development of the interoceanic corridor across centuries. 
This focus on the Caribbean basin has hindered a more nuanced understanding of area’s 
historical geography, with detrimental implications for advancing Panama’s 
environmental history and Panama City’s urban history. However, shifting the focus to 
the Pacific basin sheds light on the transformation of the immediate hinterland and river 
systems of the country’s largest metropolitan city, and thus on the origins of the 
contemporary environmental problems of the metropolitan area. 
The history of Panama’s transit activity, its raison d’etre, lies at the intersection of 
environmental history and the history of imperialism in the region. Intellectual 
frameworks have been developed that enable us to understand the process by which the 
natural world underwent significant degradation in the modern colonial world, mainly as 
                                                          
4 Bonifacio Pereira Jimenez, Biografia del Rio Chagres (Panama City: Imprenta Nacional, 2nd ed., 1964), 33. 
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a result of the onset of capitalist relations of labor, and its influence on human’s views of 
the natural world.  
In the early twentieth century, intellectuals in the neo-imperial metropoles were 
already starting to question the ecological impact of extractivism on the colonies and 
imperial spheres of influence. The French geographer Jean Brunhes developed the 
concept of Raubwirtschaft,5 or plunder economy, to understand the situated differential 
exploitation of natural resources by natives and ‘civilized’ groups that move in later.6 
Years later, Carl Sauer, the father of American historical geography, also questioned how 
much of what we hailed as production was in reality just extraction. In 1938, Sauer, 
aware of the impact his country had had on the natural resources of humid tropical 
America, urged scholars to evaluate all colonial cultures “by the use it makes of the land 
it occupies.”7  
Sauer’s adherents became concerned with the despoliation associated with 
extractive frontiers and its legacies.8 These scholars became the chief proponents of the 
“cultural landscape”9 as a cross-disciplinary approach to blur the problematic boundaries 
                                                          
5 Brunhes built on the concept originated by German geographer Ernst Friedrich (b. 1867), initially used to 
denote a type of occupation where there is no intention of developing the colony economically more than 
strictly needed for exploitation purposes. For a history of the concept, see Joan Martinez-Alier, De la 
Economía Ecológica al Ecologismo Popular (Barcelona: Icaria Editorial, 1994), 63 – 64. 
6 Jean Brunhes, La Géographie Humaine. Essai de classification positive. Principes et exemples (Paris: Félix 
Alcan, 1910). For an explicit examination of this concept applied to the field of Latin American 
environmental history, see Guillermo Castro Herrera, “Environmental History (Made) in Latin America,” H-
NET Global Historiography Series (2001). 
7 Carl O. Sauer, “Destructive Exploitation in Modern Colonial Expansion” (1938) in Carl Sauer on Culture 
and Landscape: Readings and Commentaries, eds. William M. Denevan and Kent Matthewson (Baton 
Rouge, LA: LSU press, 2009); 245.  
8 Sauer established what became known as the “Berkley School” of geographic thought. Their work 
contained “dire warnings about resource depletion, species extinction, soil erosion, and overpopulation” 
which “signaled a renewed geographic interest in the limits of the earth to sustain human populations in 
the modern age.”8 For a comprehensive expression of Berkley School themes, see Man's Role in Changing 
the Face of the Earth, ed. William L. Thomas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). 
9 Sauer argued that “The works of man express themselves in the cultural landscape. There may be a 
succession of these landscapes with a succession of the cultures. They are derived in each case from the 
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of the nature-culture binary. Recent scholarship of this type on Latin America’s historical 
ecology has fruitfully questioned the “pristine myth,” which posited the region as the 
First Eden and the kingdom of the “ecologically noble savage.”10 Research on Latin 
America’s cultural landscapes “examines various views of nature and various historical 
forces—” such as ideas, memories, and beliefs— “that shaped both environmental 
change and human-environment interactions over time,” based on the assumption that the 
region’s “different social groups at distinct times saw nature and landscape quite 
differently.”11 
 The conceptual framework of this thesis also fits within the approach to the study 
of longue duree environmental change based on ecological materialism proposed by 
environmental historians such as Jason Moore. This framework roots the origins of the 
contemporary global environmental crisis in the “transition to capitalism during the long 
sixteenth century (1450- 1640),”12  a process that fed off the exploitation of commodity 
frontiers such as silver, sugar, or, in the case of Panama, specialized transit. Across 
spatial and temporal scales, this transition produced and intensified what Marx called a 
“metabolic rift,” a “progressively deepening rupture in the nutrient cycling between the 
country and the city.”  In turn, this rift drove the need to secure new sources of cheap 
labor and land to sustain capital accumulation, leading to “renewed and extended cycles 
                                                                                                                                                                             
natural landscape, man [sic] expressing his place in nature as a distinct agent of modification.” Carl O. 
Sauer, “The Morphology of Landscape,” (1925) in Land and Life; a Selection from the Writings of Carl 
Ortwin Sauer, ed. John Leighly (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963); 333. 
10 Mark Carey, “Latin American Environmental History: Current Trends, Interdisciplinary Insights, and 
Future Directions,” Environmental History 14 (2009), 233. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Jason W. Moore, “Environmental Crises and the Metabolic Rift in World-Historical Perspective,” 
Organization & Environment 13, no. 2 (2000), 123. 
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of unsustainable development on a world-scale.”13 Adopting the prisms of water history 
and global social metabolism, this thesis will contextualize the radical transformation of a 
particular river valley whose tragic ecological fate has been historically linked to 
Panama’s history and, thus, with the isthmus’ traditional transit activity and its 
corresponding relationship with nature and the world market. 
The concept of social metabolism, a biological metaphor, proves fruitful for 
contextualizing the human and non-human drivers of environmental change. The use of 
metabolization as an explanatory analogy for collective human and network behavior 
offers “a powerful unifying concept to relate the functioning of society to its 
consequences upon the environment.” Highlighting the cultural importance of the study 
of energy and material flows,14 the social metabolism framework forces researchers to 
focus on the material and intellectual consequences of fluctuating flows of fuels, 
nutrients, and capital. Despite its logical home in agricultural history,15 urban 
environmental history also benefits from the analytical depth opened by the category of 
social metabolism, which enables a conceptualization of landscape and systemic 
processes not only in terms of human agency, but “as manifestations of biotic interactions 
between people and the land." 16 Revealing case studies and novel theoretical approaches 
                                                          
13 Jason W. Moore, “The Modern World-System as Environmental History? Ecology and the Rise of 
Capitalism,” Theory and Society 32, no. 3 (2003), 309. 
14 Marina Fischer-Kowalski, “Society’s Metabolism: The Intellectual History of Materials Flow Analysis, Part 
I, 1860- 1970,” Journal of Industrial Ecology 2, no. 1 (1998), 61–78. 
15 See for example Brett Clark and John Bellamy Foster, “Ecological Imperialism and the Global Metabolic 
Rift: Unequal Exchange and the Guano/Nitrates Trade,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 
50, no. 3-4 (2009), 311– 334; Jason W. Moore, “The End of the Road? Agricultural Revolutions in the 
Capitalist World-Ecology, 1450-2010,” Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 3 (2010), 389–413. 
16 Metabolization as used in biological and ecological studies refers to “a summation of biological 
reactions,” including “the processes by which raw materials from the environment are broken down, the 
processes by which living cells and energy are produced as well as regulatory mechanisms.” See Alfred H. 
Siemens, Patricia Moreno-Casasola, and Clorinda Sarabia Bueno, “The Metabolization of Dunes and 
Wetlands by the City of Veracruz, Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Geography 5, no. 1 (2006), 7–29. 
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to the study of the relation between colonial extraction – of raw materials, labor or 
commodities – and changes in social metabolism and landscapes have been produced.17  
The origins of Latin America’s environmental crises lie in the type and scale of 
human interventions in the ecosystems of the past. The decision-making behind many of 
the most significant modifications of landscape, organization of labor, and ecology in the 
region’s history often took place outside of the continent. As Mark Carey puts it, the 
“mode of production and the class structure of every place have been continually 
determined from outside, by their incorporation and integration into global capitalism.”18 
The exploitation of the Panama’s ‘geographic resource,’ a main driver of environmental 
degradation, has adopted different facades and patterns of resource use over the centuries, 
mirroring changing geopolitical and technological paradigms. The long history of human-
induced environmental change in central Pacific Panama, which has been the site of the 
‘official’ interoceanic corridor for over 400 years, was marked by the interaction of 
transnational forces and nature. Global agents of environmental change, such as 
mercantilism and imperialism, came into friction with more localized ones, including 
capital accumulation and the provision of a food and water supply for an ever changing 
Panama City.  
In Panamanian historiography, the main theoretical insights this paper borrows are 
grounded on the work of two of Panama’s most influential historians. Alfredo Castillero 
Calvo, who in the 1970s identified the country`s most persistent and salient longue durée, 
                                                          
17 Joan Martinez-Alier, “Marxism, Social Metabolism, and International Trade,” in Alf Hornborg, J.R. 
McNeill, and Joan Martinez-Alier, eds., Rethinking Environmental History: World-System History and 
Global Environmental Change (Lanham, Md.: Altamira Press, 2007), 221 – 38; Rebecca Clausen and Brett 
Clark, “The Metabolic Rift and Marine Ecology: An Analysis of the Ocean Crisis Within Capitalist 
Production,” Organization & Environment 18, no. 4 (2005), 422–44. 
18 Carey, “Latin American Environmental History: Current Trends…,” 226. 
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“transitismo” (transit-ism), to make sense of the complicated history of human behavior 
on the isthmus. The concept helps elucidate the particular economic and social structures 
resulting from the insertion of Panama into the emerging world market, following the 
Spanish conquest in the early sixteenth century. Prior to the arrival of whites, indigenous 
groups maintained several transisthmian corridors across the territory. However, the 
Spanish established a monopolistic and centralized control over a single route linking 
both world oceans, an arrangement that has persisted to the present-day—albeit in altered 
forms. The formation of landscapes associated with colonial transit activity reinforced the 
worldview of the local oligarchy, often a market-dominant minority connected to transit 
activities. Besides the direct hegemony over the “geographic resource,” transitismo also 
posits the underdevelopment of other productive activity due to the overreliance on the 
transportation and service sectors of the economy. 
Guillermo Castro Herrera has grappled with the main problems of Panama’s 
environmental history in an effort to provide a historical perspective to the development 
of a blueprint for national sustainable development. Castro Herrera applied Castillero’s 
concept of transitismo to environmental history, examining its socioecological impact 
over time, and tracing to it the origins of some of the most troubling problems and 
contradictions of Latin American19 and Panama’s environmental history.20 Following 
Donald Worster’s study of water control in the arid American West, Castro Herrera 
fruitfully applied historian Karl Wittfogel’s theory of hydraulic empire to understand the 
authoritarianisms suffered by Panama during the last century. Wittfogel’s thesis argued 
                                                          
19 Guillermo Castro Herrera, “The Environmental Crisis and the Tasks of History in Latin America,” 
Environment and History 3, no. 1 (1997): 1–18. 
20 Guillermo Castro Herrera, "Isthmus in the World: Elements for an Environmental History of Panama." 
Global Environment 1 (2008): 10–55. 
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that, in the context of ancient Chinese civilization, the Asiatic mode of production’s 
reliance on large-scale irrigation works led to bureaucratic despotism and structural 
ossification and, in turn, stymied movements originating from civil society and crushed 
efforts at reform.21 Although the use of the theory of hydraulic despotism by Wittfogel 
and Worster was mostly concerned with irrigation in agricultural societies, the theory, as 
Castro Herrera shows with a case study of Panama, can be applied to any social or 
government structure which maintains power and control through exclusive control over 
access to water. Water serves as an economic mediator tying nation-states to their 
resource base and material spaces.  
Through the prism of a strategic river valley, this study attempts to examine the 
relation between transitismo and environmental change over time in central Panama. 
Entire landscapes that had performed an important role in forging Panamanians’ historic 
identity disappeared due to the radical physical transformation entailed by the canal.22 
Although the forces of nature posed great challenges for American engineers, this aspect 
of the waterway’s history has been simplified under the traditional triumphalist narratives 
explaining the canal’s history. Historical geographer Omar Jaén Suárez offers a 
description of the environmental changes deriving from the combined impact that French 
and American canal building had on central Panama’s ecosystems: 
During almost 40 years of work in the central isthmus of Panama the most profound changes on the 
natural environment were produced… the derivation of the Chagres river, the creation of 423 km2 
Gatun lake and the smaller Miraflores lake, the construction of dams and locks, the removal of 
                                                          
21 See Karl August Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism; a Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1957); K. A Wittfogel, The Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic History 
(Paris:Alcan, 1935). 
22 Guillermo Castro Herrera, “PRO MUNDI BENEFICIO: Elementos para una Historia Ambiental de Panamá 
II,” in Historia General de Panamá, ed. Alfredo Castillero Calvo (Panama City: Comité Nacional del 
Centenario de la República de Panamá, 2004); 138. 
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hundreds of millions of cubic meters of earth and rock from the future canal channels… the 
landfills of Colon and Panama, the drainage of huge swamps, and the suppression of the Rio 
Grande at the Pacific entrance of the Panama Canal.23 
If one ponders the magnitude and pace of change in the isthmus during the long 
nineteenth century, the pending task in Panama’s environmental history remains the need 
to “resignify and reconstruct” these forgotten landscapes based on “chronicles, technical 
documents, and literary works.”5 This thesis aims to contribute to this need by elucidating 
the history of the spaces around the southern access channel of the Panama Canal. These 
areas of Panama’s Pacific basin were completely altered and alienated from its rightful 
inhabitants owing to the establishment of the Canal Zone. The Río Grande valley’s 
devastation is representative and symbolic of one of the most important environmental 
changes occurring within the transit region: the transformation of entire agricultural 
landscapes associated with Panama’s urban areas into transit landscapes during the 
construction of the U.S. controlled waterway and territory.24  
The environmental history of Latin American rivers is still an emerging field. 
Monographs on river histories are numerous in the environmental history literature of 
other regions, a product of the rich window that the study of human-river relations opens 
into the changing relationship between society and nature.25 Humans’ close relationship 
to water, especially freshwater, has always encouraged locating settlements near reliable 
sources. An interdisciplinary approach to water history, including rivers, enables a 
                                                          
23 Omar Jaén Suárez, La Población del Istmo de Panamá: Estudio de Geohistoria (Madrid: Ediciones de 
Cultura Hispánica, 1998); 326. 
24 Castro Herrera, “PRO MUNDI BENEFICIO,” 138. 
25 For similar approaches see: Philip V. Scarpino, Great River: An Environmental History of the Upper 
Mississippi, 1890-1950 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1985); Michael F. Logan,  The 
Lessening Stream : An Environmental History of the Santa Cruz River (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona 
Press, 2002); and Evan R. Ward, Border Oasis : Water and the Political Ecology of the Colorado River Delta, 
1940-1975 (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2003). 
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synthesis of its co-evolution in relation to human history, incorporating insights from 
fields such as cultural, economic, science and technology, social, political, and religious 
history as well as drawing from other disciplines. As Hernán Lasso points out, with the 
exception of Brazil, studies focusing on rivers as subjects of analysis have been scant in 
the Latin American environmental historiography. Despite its abundance of freshwater 
and generally well-watered territory, this type of research has not featured prominently in 
the field’s literature, focusing more efforts at merging environmental history with other 
historiographical currents such as: cultural history, social history, intellectual history, and 
others.26 A global process of accumulation characterized by the conversion of natural into 
financial capital accelerated after World War II, and Latin American rivers and 
waterscapes were subjected to modernizing pressures. Developmentalist politicians 
promoted public-works projects and intense dam-building. However, as the Panama 
Canal’s case shows, there are precedents to large transformations of watersheds by 
transnational capital and foreign interventions.   
This examination of a Central American river basin strives to enrich the current 
discussion about what the Canal Zone meant for the long-term structures of Panamanian 
society. Beyond the canal’s similarities with the Suez Canal and other crucial straits 
throughout the world,27 scholars have conceptualized the Panama Canal Zone as one of 
many off-limits company towns of transnational capital that flourished throughout Latin 
America during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Central Panama’s transit 
region was the main, but not only, locus of the US federal government’s presence on the 
                                                          
26 Hugo Hernán Lasso Otaya, “Notes for the environmental history of Machángara River at Quito in the 
twentieth century,” HALAC 2, vol. 4 (2015), 249. 
27 In English, a critical treatment of the Suez Canal include D.A. Farnie, East and West of Suez: The Suez 
Canal in History, 1854- 1956 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969). 
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isthmus during the twentieth century. The spaces of the Canal Zone, similar to the United 
Fruit Company’s banana plantations or burgeoning US military base complex, were the 
domain of absentee capitalist and imperialist logics which dictated land-use. This thesis 
aims to enrich the literature on the environmental impacts of these neo-colonial ventures 
on the world-system’s periphery, while highlighting the uniqueness of the quasi-military, 
quasi-civilian Panama Canal Zone among neo-colonial enclaves in Latin America. This 
thesis also strives to enrich Latin American environmental history’s ties to activism and 
sustainability. This stance remains viable, and urgent, despite disciplinary criticisms of 
presentism, culpability, “declensionism,” or accounts of progressive decline of the natural 
world under human activity.28  
 In light of the impact of high population density on the quality of life in the transit 
region, and the near completion of the Panama Canal Expansion Project which embodies 
a continuation of resource use and political economic practices,29 this thesis also intends 
to illuminate the scale of the ‘urban.’ Greater Panama City’s modern environmental 
history is inextricably linked to that of the canal and its changing political ecology of 
water.  The capital’s urban growth was ultimately shaped by the territorial restrictions 
placed by the Canal Zone’s enclosure and, later, ecological ones following the 
                                                          
28 Eloquent articulations of this line of critique can be found in J.R. McNeill, “The Historiography of 
Environmental History” in The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 5: Historical Writing since 
1945, eds. Axel Schneider and Daniel Woolf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 164. 
29 Panama’s current environmental predicament is characterized, as Castro Herrera argues, by a 
contradiction between transitismo and transit. The former refers the structures determining the range of 
social action within which elites have historically depended on retaining a tertiary, service economy 
hyper-specialized toward facilitating the transit of goods, people, and capital across the isthmus. The 
latter refers to the modern-day practice of enabling ships to traverse the Panama Canal at the expense of 
social, ecological, and economic alternatives. Although this contradiction has many expressions in 
conflicts of political ecology throughout the country, it is clearly evident in the quandary it poses to 
central Panama’s water management regime and sustainable development, both issues directly related to 
the Panama Canal and control over the waters of the modern Rio Chagres basin. This thesis aims to 
contribute to a better understanding of the origins of this contradictions; the water history of Panama City 
spatially and temporally intertwines communication, sanitation, energy, and imperial materialities. 
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establishment of an official, protected Canal Watershed area. A virtual straitjacket to any 
organic urbanization, the spatial limits to Panama City’s expansion in the twentieth 
century determined the landscapes created by geopolitical tension and bourgeois cultural 
attitudes.30 The following narrative tracing the Río Grande valley’s history, through its 
connectedness with the largest city on the shoreline of Panama Bay, serves as a local case 
study of the planetary dynamic of agro-ecological metabolic rift proposed by Moore.  
Panama’s interoceanic corridor’s problematic dialectic comprising glocal 
sustainability and the legacies of unequal relationships with world markets and global 
metabolism can be unpacked by its changing waterscapes, water uses, and fluvial 
systems. The problematic interconnectedness of the canal's and the city's day to day 
functioning – through the sharing of a common watershed31 for the distribution of water 
for over half of Panama's national population, as well as huge volumes of freshwater for 
the operation of the locks – has its origins in a convoluted process of environmental 
change in the early twentieth century. Therefore, this thesis attempts to employ the 
methodology of environmental history to further demonstrate how Panama’s dependency 
on foreign powers and a one-dimensional productive apparatus altered social and cultural 
paradigms, including Panamanians’ collective relationship to nature.  
                                                          
30 The result of the combination of demographic and economic growth with political ecological limits has 
been urban disorder, and the resultant social chaos and environmental degradation of water sources and 
land are troubling. These legacies continue to condition Panama City’s and the transit region’s 
urbanization, with detrimental long-term implications for the distribution of urban water and 
sustainability. 
31 Today, this water comes from lakes Gatun and Alajuela, man-made reservoirs on the Rio Chagres that 
provide for the hydroelectric and hydraulic demands of the canal. However, these lakes are also 
responsible for providing potable water to the terminal cities of the transit region, in addition to water for 
the generation of electricity for non-Canal related industry. The country’s economy and major urban 
settlements depend on a common watershed management regime which resulted from the merge of the 
Rio Grande into the Rio Chagres. 
17 
 
Within the US environmental historiography, the questions at the center of this 
thesis are a response to Paul Sutter’s grievance that “Environmental historians of the 
United States have been slow to move beyond the nation’s borders to chart the 
environmental implications of the United States as a hemispheric and global actor,” and 
that “environment has only rarely been taken seriously as one of those material 
dimensions shaping imperial power.”32 The irreversible consequences of Latin American 
neo-colonialism for natural environments and resources, and the ecological footprint of 
military bases33 and extractive enclaves, are increasingly seen as vital to larger 
transnational and inter-disciplinary debates.  
Despite its historical and logistical significance to the canal, David McCullough’s 
bestseller, The Path Between the Seas, only mentions the Rio Grande sparingly and fails 
to recognize the importance of its transformation. McCullough refers to it only as a 
“noisy narrow torrent winding along through dense forests below the track,”34 paralleling 
the Panama Railroad finished in 1855. The only detailed scholarly treatment of the Rio 
Grande’s history is included in the first chapter of Eduardo Tejeira Davis’s architectural 
                                                          
32 Sutter’s own work on the Panama Canal’s construction strove to “move away from analyses of 
discursive and representational practices and toward the material dimensions of imperial control — to a 
focus on how power has been exercised on the ground.” In relation to “environmental management” 
specifically, Sutter writes that “historians of U.S. empire have only just begun to recognize its centrality … 
to the nation’s extracontinental expansion.” Paul S. Sutter, “Nature’s Agents or Agents of Empire? 
Entomological Workers and Environmental Change during the Construction of the Panama Canal,” ISIS 98 
(2007); 727. 
33 The ecological impact of militarized landscapes beyond the mainland US is beginning to be studied, 
especially in literary works that embrace themes of environmental justice. However, the impact on 
waterscapes and urban growth are seldom explored; see Hsuan Hsu, “Representing Environmental Risk in 
the Landscapes of US Militarization,”  Environment and Society Portal (Virtual Exhibitions no. 1, 2014) 
<environmentandsociety.org>. 
34 David McCullough, The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870 – 1914 (Simon 
& Schuster, 1977), 113. 
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and planning history of Ciudad del Saber (City of Knowledge),35 a research and 
development complex established in a reverted and repurposed U.S. military based built 
in 1919 on a riverbank of the Rio Grande. Tejeira Davis notes that the only geographical 
feature that remains intact in the area is the Rio Cardenas, a tributary of the Rio Grande 
that joined the basin’s main river north of Panama City.36  This thesis will build upon 
Tejeira Davis’s work to provide a more comprehensive environmental perspective of the 
river’s history, drawing from diverse fields such as Latin American, U.S., and science 
and technology historiographies.  
Panama Canal connected river ecosystems that had been separated for 
evolutionary eras. Understanding the spread of species spatially along the Panama Canal, 
for instance, requires a diachronic picture of the area prior to its construction. The 
reorganization of the environment generated a species mix that is hard to gauge without a 
historical perspective.37 The immediate environmental consequences of uniting the 
world’s oceans through the linking of isthmian rivers have fascinated scientists for 
decades.38 A recent study of invasive species in the Panama Canal Watershed compared 
                                                          
35 Eduardo Tejeira Davis, Ciudad del Saber: Un Legado en Construcción (Panama: Editorial Ciudad del 
Saber, 2010).  
36 Ibid., 14 – 15. 
37 See Pamela Henson’s piece, “A Baseline Environmental Survey: The 1910–12 Smithsonian Biological 
Survey of the Panama Canal Zone,” in Ashley Carse, Christine Keiner, Pamela M. Henson, Marixa Lasso, 
Paul S. Sutter, Megan Raby, and Blake Scott, “Panama Canal Forum: From the Conquest of Nature to the 
Construction of New Ecologies,” Environmental History 21 (2016), 206–287. 
38 The term ‘immediate’ aims to differentiate the consequences for local ecosystems from those affecting 
regional or global ecosystems, which are harder to ascribe to the opening of the strait. For an early 
example of this line of research dealing specifically with fish, see S. E. Meek and S. F. Hildebrand, “The 
fishes of the fresh waters of Panama,” Zooogical Series 10, n. 15 (Field Museum of Natural History, 1909), 
217– 374.  
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the species make-up of the two distinct river basins that were welded together into one in 
the early twentieth century: the Río Chagres and the Río Grande.39  
Although some of the towns named after its tributaries survive, and the 
headwaters of some of its feeders remain alive, the river has diluted from collective 
memory. Nonetheless, the latest stage in the history of the interoceanic corridor across 
central Panama has endured to our days, and its materiality has had the greatest 
environmental impact upon the Rio Grande. Therefore, this narrative will favor the early 
twentieth century because the rate of morphological and social change in the region 
accelerated dramatically during this period, just after the end of the Thousand Days’ War 
in 1902, and left an important imprint on the transit landscapes and waterscapes of the 












                                                          
39 S.A. Smith et al., “Cross-Cordillera exchange mediated by the Panama Canal increased the species 
richness of local freshwater fish assemblages,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Biol Sci 271 




NATURAL HISTORY AND PRE-COLUMBIAN CORRIDOR 
 
 
From jutting peninsulas to island continents, our planet boasts some unique land 
formations. Among these workings of the earth’s inner layers, the isthmus of Panama is 
unique. The area of southern Central America is subject to the interaction of five different 
tectonic plates, with three of these meeting at two separate junctures, accounting for a 
volatile and complex geologic zone.  After the breakup of Pangea, the landmasses of 
North America and South America were isolated from each other. These spatial 
differences are crucial to understanding why human schemes to link both the Atlantic and 
Pacific have historically concentrated in central Panama and, more importantly, how 
nature has shaped these interoceanic ventures. “The geographical position of Panama and 
its diverse historical circumstances,” as Carlos Malgrat asserted, “constitutes the principal 
cause of the existence of diverse groups of humans on the isthmus.”40  
About 65 million years ago, between the two Americas lay a series of islands of 
volcanic origin which would later be called Costa Rica and western Panama. Gradually, a 
sill41 one thousand meters underwater formed between the two oceans. This deposit of 
volcanic material already contained the bedrock of what would comprise the future transit 
region.42 Caused at least in part by a growth spurt in the Antarctic ice sheet decreasing 
                                                          
40 Carlos Malgrat, “Contribución al estudio de la personalidad básica del panameño,” in Panamá en sus 
usos y costumbres, ed. Stanley Heckadon Moreno (Panama City: Editorial Universitaria), 389.  
41 In Geology, a sill is an underwater ridge or rock ledge extending across the bed of a body of water. 




sea levels, the sill became an archipelago due to the uplift of the isthmus and differences 
in elevation across its extension. The land barrier between the oceans completely rose 
above water between three and six million years ago. During recent geologic time, the 
Pacific coastal waters were fifty meters below current levels; an important portion of 
today’s Panama Bay was coastal plain featuring hills whose peaks constitute today’s 
offshore islands.  
The formation of the isthmus altered the very dynamics of the earth. Rather than a 
sudden emergence, this was a protracted process that produced the unique geological mix 
of terrains in the center of the isthmus. The formation of the barrier between the oceans 
isolated two distinct coastal ecosystems. This allowed for separate and distinct natural 
histories to develop, resulting in different coastal geographies along both shorelines. The 
isthmus obstructed an ancient current of water, known as the Tropical American Seaway, 
and diverted it northward, creating the Gulf Stream. The trade winds, which blow from 
northeast to southwest through Panama, faced a new obstacle that forced them to blow 
between new mountain passes, resulting in a patchwork of drought-prone regions in the 
Pacific basin.  
Eons before it became a crossroads between human realms, the isthmus formed “a 
land bridge over which inhabitants of each America invaded each other —the so-called 
Great American Biotic Interchange.”43 These invasions transformed the terrestrial flora 
and fauna of two continental ecosystems. The natural nexus provided the structural 
opportunities for mobile species eager to colonize higher or lower latitudes. The forests 
of southern Central America evolved, from resembling those of the present day Southern 
                                                          
43 Egbert G. Leigh and Aaron O’Dea, “Historical biogeography of the Isthmus of Panama,” Biological 
Reviews 89 (2014), 148. 
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United States, to looking more like their South American counterparts. This interchange 
also altered plant and animal assemblages of the land bridge that enabled it, creating the 
base for the eclectic biodiversity that survives today. In 2005, a study estimated that sixty 
percent of tree species in central Panama (433 species!) traced their origins to cross-
Andean or Amazon basin ecosystems.44 Endemic animals, mostly grazers like giant and 
regular sloths but also forest dwellers like raccoons, took advantage of the isthmus` 
“mosaic of plant communities” to reach South and North America, while altering the land 
bridge’s landscape on their way. The records of migrations and pollen recordings point 
towards a persistent, evolving evergreen forest cover – albeit with stretches of grassland – 
that acted as a “filter for species,” accounting for its rich biodiversity.45   
Accidents of geology and the fluctuations of the climate system endowed Panama 
with unequaled natural attributes favoring human settlement. Wind and ocean circulation 
dynamics create hurricanes that scourge the belt running from Costa Rica to Yucatan 
with brutal regularity.46 The climate system interaction with the earth’s rotation produces 
a particularity in this area known as the Coriolis Effect,47 causing hurricanes to deviate 
just north of modern Panama in the Intertropical Convergence Zone. Much of Panama is 
thus protected from infamous Caribbean hurricanes. 
 A volcanic arc that originates in Mexico ends in El Valle, located close to the 
center of the modern republic of Panama, but far enough from what would become the 
                                                          
44 Christopher W. Dick, “Long-distance gene flow and cross-Andean dispersal of lowland rainforest bees,” 
Molecular Ecology 13 (2004), 3775-85. 
45Coates, 127-136. 
46 Ibid., 23-27. 
47 Encyclopedia Britannica.< http://abyss.uoregon.edu/~js/glossary/coriolis_effect.html> 
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transit area. These same “buckling forces” account for the earthquake belt running from 
western Panama into Mexico, again sparing the eastern half of today’s Panama.48  
The nature of Panama’s coastal landforms, comprising an elevated percentage in 
this Central American case, illustrate the traditional geomorphologies of fluvial lowlands. 
Coastal plain river valleys commonly include meandering rivers with relatively broad 
floodplains. Rivers are important components of coastal plain settings, as Paul Hudson 
explains, “their alignment and orientation playing a determinant role in the structure and 
form of a 'subtle' landscape.”49 Due to the nature of the physical structure of Central 
America’s isthmus and the ecosystems of the narrowest area with close, transoceanic 
basins, the rivers of Panama are uniquely important for the region’s physical and human 
geographies. 
The isthmus’s rivers tend to snake down its slopes carrying thick, chocolate 
waters and ending in big, littoral swamps. Their waters dye the Pacific and Caribbean 
coasts with their yellow, sepia, pink and muddy green color.50 The Caribbean slope, due 
to the proximity of the cordillera, is generally drained by shorter and more torrential 
rivers than the Pacific basin. The Pacific slope’s coastal plain, comprised of fertile but 
easily eroded soils, is drained by more linear rivers that fluctuate dramatically with the 
uncertain precipitation patterns that plague the area’s monsoon-based climate.  
In East-Central Panama, henceforth called the transit region, both oceans are 
separated by less than 100 kilometers of land that, for the most part, does not exceed 25 
meters above sea level. However, the Caribbean and Pacific coastal and inland 
                                                          
48 Coates, 13-19. 
49 Paul F. Hudson, “Floodplain Styles of the Lower Pánuco Basin, Mexico.” Journal of Latin American 
Geography 1, no. 1 (2002), 58. 
50 Jaen Suarez, Poblacion del Istmo de Panama, 316. 
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ecosystems are significantly different. Both slopes boasted portions of mangrove and 
different types of coral reefs. The belt that comprises the transit region was mostly 
covered by tropical rainforest, except for a narrow stretch of grassland along the Pacific 
coast. In this area, the cordillera dwindles down to an assemblage of short hills before 
regaining mountainous height towards Darien. This series of hillslopes and intervening 
valleys comprise the basin of the Río Chagres and the relatively meager Rio Grande. 
Historian of the construction period of the Panama Railroad, Joseph Scott, claims that: 
“The configuration of these almost-connecting river valleys had made them a trade route 
across the isthmus since the earliest times.”51  
Human groups constituted an isthmian civilization long before the conquest of the 
early Spanish Main, the process by which these peoples were incorporated into Iberian 
mainland coastal possessions surrounding the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. 
These groups had distinct adaptations to their tropical environments and understanding 
these features can enable a partial reconstruction of their settlements in the Rio Grande 
basin. It is important to note that groups on both sides of the drainage divide traded 
products that were unique to their ecosystems52; thus, interoceanic communication was a 
lived experience of early isthmian civilization. The Río Chagres on the Caribbean and the 
Pacific Rio Grande probably served as cogs of a transisthmian route, located on that 
“narrow strip of land which has long served as the primary passage between the 
                                                          
51 My emphasis. Joseph L. Scott, Rails Across Panama; the story of the building of the Panama Railroad, 
1849-1855 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1967); 4. 
52 The space occupied by the Panama Canal today, as stated before, was used by indigenous groups as 
areas of inter-ecosystem exchange and, in the first decades of the sixteenth century, was identified by the 
newly arrived Spanish as the best crossing between oceans.  
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oceans.”53 However, there were several other routes coexisting with the Chagres route 
across the isthmian region.54 
 Due to general human preferences, the drier Pacific slope was more densely 
populated than the wetter Caribbean. In central Panama, the continental divide is close to 
the southern shore of the isthmus, and the slope is thus “very steep and whatever water 
falls runs away almost immediately.”55 For at least 2000 years before the Conquest, since 
the late Neolithic period, densely populated settlements in the Pacific basin were found 
mostly on alluvial plains. The units of organization, Cacicazgos, were organized around 
the area’s rivers which generally run from North to South, and these territories generally 
paralleled their vertical orientations.56 The use of fire in agriculture and hunting was 









                                                          
53 Stanley Heckadon Moreno, “Impact of Development on the Panama Canal Environment,” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 35, n. 3 (1993), 132. 
54 Guillermo Castro Herrera, “Panama, un Territorio en Tres Tiempos,” HALAC 3, n. 1 (2014), 145 – 146.  
55 Charles Marsh, “Report on fresh-water copepoda from Panama, with descriptions of new 
species,” Smithsonian Misc. Collections 61 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1913). 
56 Ibid., 147. 
57 In fact, few patches of old growth forest remain in the transit region. Most of the present-day Canal 
Watershed’s protective forests are new growth dating to the colonial period. 
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THE CASTILLIAN CORRIDOR 
 
During the early stages of the conquest, the Spaniards were looking for an 
interoceanic passage through the Spanish Main. The establishment of Panama City, the 
first European-founded settlement on the Pacific, was determined by the immediate 
imperatives and logic of securing a colonial outpost. The site was chosen because it could 
function as the southern node within a strategic axis of settlements that provided the 
orientation for the initial territorial organization of the isthmus. A surrounding miasmatic 
environment, being flanked by mangroves and swamps on both sides, compounded the 
lack of nearby sources of potable water. Being by necessity established in Panama Bay, 
the sites of Old Panama and its successor58 did boast harbors that were usable. Following 
a fire which consumed the original settlement during the invasion and sacking by Welsh 
pirate Henry Morgan, Panamá was moved a few miles westward, closer to the mouth of 
the Rio Grande. 
The colonial core of the city was relocated in the Ancón area, the vicinity of the 
200 meter elevation overlooking the city that dominated the landscape of the lower Rio 
Grande. Castillero Calvo notes that the site was called ‘Ancón’ because of the existence 
                                                          
58 In 1671, Panama City was destroyed by a fire following an assault by privateer Henry Morgan. In 1673, 




of two ‘ancones’ or, following the Castillian term, two anchorable harbors.59 One of these 
was the mouth of the Rio Grande.  
The historic Rio Grande basin, covering approximately 85 square miles, could host 
about three hundred homesteads. Traditionally, the fluvial lowlands were inhabited by 
peoples working annual swiddens of maize, sugar mills, and stock of cattle and pigs. 
Their surplus was carried downriver aboard canoes to be sold in Panama City.60  During 
the rainy season, the streams of the Pacific basin frequently interrupted land travel across 
the savannahs along Panama’s Pacific coast. In the dry season, their stream-like trickle 
rendered them generally unnavigable. Despite great seasonal variability, the river was 
embedded within a production and distribution system of local food, and its role was 
heightened due to the general geography of the Pacific basin and the regional 
concentration of the isthmus’s population ultimately controlled by the Crown. 
The earliest description of the river remains that of Diego Ruiz de Campo, a 
seventeenth century explorer who described the hinterland of Panama City as follows: 
“A fourth of a legua from the Cerro Ancon towards the west there is an inlet that has beaches on 
both banks and has as a whole a third of a legua in width, said inlet is completely open to the south 
and in its middle drains that mouth of the rio Grande that takes the whole length, and at the 
entrance of said river lies a flat islet full of mangroves without there being any tree of benefit and 
said islet is swampy which makes the river have two channels in its mouth and the one on the right 
is more anchorable and [boats] can enter and boats go up with the tide to carry lime, honey, maize, 
plantains and other things that lie upriver which is covered by tall mangroves on both flanks that 
are of no benefit for anything […]”61 
                                                          
59 As quoted in Tejeira Davis, “El Casco Antiguo de Panama.”  
60 Jean-Pierre Tardieu, Cimarrones de Panamá: la forja de una identidad afroamericana en el siglo XVI 
(Madrid: Editorial Iberoamericana, 2009), 205. 
61 Diego Ruiz de Campos, Relación sobre la costa panamena en el Mar del Sur, quoted in Omar Jaen 
Suarez, Geografia de Panamá, p.53 
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Directly off the coast from the mouth of the Rio Grande lie four islands, the main 
ones being Naos, Flamenco, and Perico. Due to Panama Bay’s wide tidal range, the 
islands served as early harbors since the early sixteenth century. In 1591, Spanish 
engineers Juan de Tejada and Juan B. Antonelli proposed moving the city to the bank of 
the Rio Grande, owing mainly to its “handsome savannah” environments and its location 
just a half legua away from the port at Perico.62 The Spanish military engineer, Nicolás 
Rodriguez, produced a map in 1735 that traced the two transisthmian routes sponsored by 
the Crown, the Cruces and Gorgona trails, with detailed hydrologic features.63 The map 
shows a labeled Rio Grande, the names of its tributaries Rio Cárdenas and Caimitillo, and 
the topography surrounding the paths.  
The traditional narrative about the selection of the site of what would become 
Panama City includes mention of the area’s scant water resources. The water portfolio 
was poor, and depended on riverine and underground sources to even meet the 
populations’ needs.64 Nearby streams served as workplaces for washerwomen and for 
individuals dedicated to gathering water and selling it in towns. The natural environment 
in the area did not have hydrological features benefitting urban dense settlement, but the 
imperatives of empire-building and exploration made the location permanent.  
With the arrival of the Spanish and the decimation of native nations, transitismo 
emerged as the specific way of insertion of the isthmus into sixteenth century 
transnational networks and as the dominant paradigm of economic mercantilism on the 
                                                          
62 Jean-Pierre Tardieu, Cimarrones de Panamá, 205. 
63 Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, sign. MP Panamá 137, reproduced in Tejeira Davis, Ciudad del Saber: 
Un Legado en Construcción, 13. 
64 Today, this narrative is reinforced by the current hydrologic landscape of the capital’s metropolitan 
area, which features severely degraded urban streams and nearby rivers suffering from pollution and the 
uncertainties of climate change.  
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ground. Transitismo established a central axis of organization with an East to West 
direction, colonizing a savannah interior with cattle ranches in order to maintain the flow 
of bullion and biomass across the transit region. Through the majority of the colonial era, 
Panama functioned as a land bridge where merchants congregated at its termini from pain 
and America to barter and peddle their goods. This was a vital part of the Spanish 
imperial fleet and fair system, and dominated the colony’s rent-producing activities. 
The society that took root in what today is known as Panama was controlled by 
elements of a mercantile-oriented oligarchy. These sectors quickly accumulated some 
wealth deriving from their relationship with imperial transisthmian traffic. They 
dominated the tertiary apparatus articulated to Spain’s monopolistic control of the 
transisthmian route including ownership of storehouses for Incan silver, following 
Francisco Pizarro’s conquest, and other transit-related activities, such as the importation 
and reexportation of African slaves to other Spanish possessions in the Pacific. Around 
the middle of the sixteenth century, the incorporation of Peru into new mercantile 
networks brought about the articulation of the savannah hinterland of Panama City to the 
transit economy.65 This connection was brought forth as a spatial byproduct of decision-
making over land-use by a mercantile and landowning elite, the ruling class of the 
isthmus’s socio-economic formation based on slavery and dependent on livestock, a land 
gobbling economic enterprise, onto the tropical lowlands of the Pacific coast.66  
The demographic and political transition that the isthmus underwent during the 
sixteenth century left its mark in the Rio Grande valley. There are records of at least one 
                                                          
65 Guillermo Castro Herrera, El Agua Entre Los Mares, 119. 
66 Karl Butzer notes that livestock as a main economic activity was an experimental venture and 
adaptation to America: “cattle raising was small-scale and of subordinate importance in Spain, except in 
the estuarine marshland below Seville.” Karl W. Butzer, “Cattle and Sheep from Old to New Spain: 
Historical Antecedents,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 78, no. 1 (1988), 29. 
30 
 
reduccion, an artificial indian settlement established by the Spanish to control and exploit 
a previously scattered native labor force, being founded along its tributaries in 1581. 
These settlements were somewhat different in Panama due to the high and precocious 
number of African slaves, which were ‘reduced’ alongside surviving natives. Central 
America was one of the areas of the New World worst hit by the decimation of 
indigenous populations, with estimates positing a 90% mortality in the isthmus. 
The human and physical geographies of the isthmus posed challenges for the 
integration of Panama City with its hinterland. The seasonal streams carved in the Pacific 
obstructed East-West travel, hindering transportation of people and goods into the city.67 
The establishment of Spanish villas, especially those at the termini of the transithmian 
corridor, enabled the conquest of vast areas for cattle grazing. However, large areas 
remained as frontiers due to hostile indigenous settlements and impenetrable forests (such 
as the mighty Darien to the East and Bocas del Toro, famous for its more recent history 
as a banana and later eco-tourism locale).  Despite the prodigious availability of cattle 
and the fact that dried beef, cattle lard, and skins was exported during the colonial era, the 
Panamanian diet suffered shortages that exacerbated whenever rumors of pirate attacks 
swirled.68 Flat field agriculture and plowing methods did not thrive in the isthmus, and 
Panama became the only Latin American country where rice was as common as maize. 
The few plantations established on the isthmus produced sugar cane and cotton, but most 
cultivated land was worked by small producers of coffee, mangoes, cacao, plantains, and 
                                                          
67 Omar Jaen Suarez, La Poblacion del Istmo de Panama, 136. 
68 Alfredo Castillero Calvo, 428 
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bananas. By the late colonial period, pasture occupied more land than crops, supporting 
close to 193 000 heads of cattle, but still 93% of the land was forested.69  
The colonial interoceanic route was usually a combination of overland and fluvial 
segments, and the corridor could not be traversed in fewer than four days, or more 
depending on weather conditions. The most important route depended on mules brought 
from stables in Central America and African slaves that drove the mule trains. Loaded 
with silver, these mules required large quantities of maize to work. The functioning of 
this early isthmian route, that in the Pacific slope ran parallel to the Rio Grande, enabled 
Europe to develop the so-called original accumulation, as the huge flow of precious 
metals from South America to Spain via Panama played a critical role in the monetization 
necessary to create a modern market economy. The exploitation of Panama’s geographic 
resource during the initial period of an interoceanic corridor connected to the emerging 
world system depended wholly on human and animal energy: African muleteers and 
bogas provided transportation services by providing smooth interoceanic passages for 
both local and foreign masters.  
Transisthmian transit was extremely dependent on local conditions, from 
microclimates in both basins to the ability to control a labor force. The subjugation of 
Indians and African slaves was essential for the urban elite to profit from the transit 
enterprise. The isthmus’ rivers and their valleys were central in this corridor. Producing 
food to feed transit workers and pack mules was also a need that had to be addressed 
locally.  The mercantile-oriented oligarchs turned strongly to cattle raising in the 
anthropic savannahs of the capital’s hinterland, establishing the defining characteristic of 
Panamanian food systems. Pedro Arias Davila, the first governor of Panama City, 
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introduced 50 heads of cattle from his hacienda in Jamaica, providing the stock for future 
cattle economies from Nicaragua to Peru. As Castro Herrera puts it, “this was largely 
possible because cattle found an exceptionally favorable niche in the savannahs that the 
aboriginal population had created over the previous 2,000 years, mainly in the central and 
western plains of the Pacific basin of the Isthmus.”70 
The animal protein that was raised in the countryside served to feed transit 
workers whose labor was coerced for imperial transportation rather than agricultural or 
other extractivist production. Besides its intrinsic relationship to the Spanish treasure fleet 
through its sustaining foodstuffs, cattle raising presented clear benefits as a supporting 
economic activity in this colonial outpost on the edge of European civilization: the 
colonizing of ecosystems through conversion of land to pasture, exclusive resource use 
through land titling reinforced the privilege of whiteness in Spanish Panama, the 
superabundance of cattle afforded a degree of food security in the transit region, cattle 
corpses produced important market products including tallow and fiber-like products, and 
livestock functioned as a mobile bank account in drought-prone central Pacific Panama.  
The grasslands of the Pacific slope’s coastal plain were a combination of natural 
and anthropic savannahs. The most common grasses included a stable assemblage of 
drought-tolerating species which, until the middle of the nineteenth century, included: 
broad stalkgrass (e.g. Pharos latifolius), Arundinella deppeana, and Trasya sp. The most 
important weed of the savannah was Mimosa pudica.  Historically, the savannahs of the 
Pacific basin were not continuous, but were interrupted by gallery forests flanking the 
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streams.71  This mosaic of environments, a vast brushland savannah laced with riparian 
woodlands, persisted especially up to the nineteenth century. The area between the last 
coastal plains and mouth of the Rio Grande and Old Panama was under pasture since 
before the destruction of Old Panama.  
Boom and bust cycles of economic bonanza defined Panama’s economy and the 
metabolism of available natural and human resources. The geographic resource became 
fetishized under the ideology of transitismo, and its logic guided official land-use patterns 
far beyond the transit region during the colonial era. Despite fluctuations in transit 
activity throughout the colonial period, population never rose above 1500 inhabitants 
dependent on agriculture and the transport of passenger and cargo, by mule and small 
boat, across the isthmus.72 The cattle-based economies of the rest of the Pacific slope, 
extending into the lowlands of the Azuero Peninsula and further even to modern-day 
Chiriqui province, had particular ecological effects on their native landscapes. The 
problems of deforestation, land monopolies, soil depletion, and erosion associated with 
the cattle centered agrarian activity in Panama need to be understood in relation to 
transitismo’s demand for resources far beyond the transit region.  
The transit landscapes associated with the early imperial routes, the so-called 
Cruces and Gorgona trails, were the result of a strictly controlled route handling low 
intensity commodity flows. The “preindustrial transit,” flowing from 1550 to 1850, was 
financed by domestic capital and fueled by slave or peon labor. The technology enabling 
the first capitalist iteration of the transoceanic corridor --- stone trails, mules, feed, and 
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small settlements at river crossings --- was “adapted to the restrictions of the 
environment” and this arrangement persisted beyond independence of 1821.73  
In 1827, John A. Lloyd, Simon Bolivar’s envoy to Panama to determine the best 
route for a road or a canal, described the Rio Grande as “emerging close to a hill called 
Pedro Miguel, and becoming navigable for large canoes as it receives several creeks.”74 
Lloyd also calls attention to the sandbank blocking the mouth of the river, two miles west 
of Panama City, attributing this feature to the low tide of the Bay dropping below two 
feet at the entrance.  
The decision-making pertaining to interoceanic transit across the isthmus of 
Panama was mostly located outside of the isthmus. However, human agency was exerted 
on the ground – albeit unequally – following colonial and republican Latin America’s 
patterns of governance. At this point it would be helpful to understand the worldview of 
Panamanian elites who have collaborated in establishing and perpetuating transitismo 
since the sixteenth century and, thus, have shaped the range of relations possible between 
humans and the Rio Grande basin. 
The evident incapacity of the New Granada’s establishment to adequately manage 
the transisthmian transit in the conditions of world trade emerging in the mid-nineteenth 
century fed the isthmus’ elites reasons to envision a different relation to the world 
market. Mariano Arosemena, one of Panama’s leading intellectuals during the first half of 
the nineteenth century, argued that if Panama was to exploit its maritime potential it 
needed more contact with North Atlantic societies and more freedom from the influence 
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of conservative Bogota.75 Panama’s majority black population, which was becoming 
increasingly organized and incorporated into republican life, added to elite concerns 
about sustained prosperity. Although Panama never developed an intensive export-
oriented plantation economy, the transit economy and the transit region’s role in Spanish 
America perpetuated a population dominated by slaves and free people of color. In part 
as a strategy for legitimizing their power and to avert an uprising evoking Haiti’s 
revolution, Arosemena explains that “We [elites] occupied ourselves with proposing 
laws… that were necessary for the growth of intermaritime traffic.”76  
 Panama’s white ruling class formulated a new blueprint for the future: a 
“Hanseatic project.” In the mid-nineteenth century, the term comunicación, or 
communication, was a term used regularly by Panamanian thinkers to denote the 
“circulation of goods, people, and information from one point of the planet to another.” 
For these writers, the concept of sovereignty, or “soberanía,” was primarily concerned 
with “the organization and enactment of power over territory and flows of people, 
information and goods through governmental and extra-governmental means.”77 The 
oligarchy espoused an ideology that did not leave room for the development of 
productive forces not directly related to their concept of communication as production. 
Their vision entailed perpetual dependence on international transit and close 
interaction with white foreigners. The internationalizing bent of this precursor of the 
modern globalization ideal was to transform Panama into an “emporium of universal 
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commerce.”78 The so-called anseatista movement proposed that Panama, like the 
Hanseatic ports of Baltic maritime trade, should enjoy special status as a free-trade zone: 
managing its own affairs but protected by one or more major maritime powers. Despite 
conflicting cultures of nature co-existing in the Panamanian territory, urban and transit-
dependent elites consolidated control upon the larger society’s relationship to the 
interoceanic environment. Arosemena, for example, envisioned the anticipated entry of 
the interoceanic corridor into the industrial age.79 In 1824, the writer and businessman 
specified the ideal conditions of the exploitation of the isthmus’ geographic resource, 
demanding it materialized as a fluvial route, as opposed to rumors about possible 
railways, traversing the historic transit region and uniting the Río Chagres and Rio 
Grande.80 
Nonetheless, the rising political ambitions of creole lawmakers did not have a 
significant impact on des-accelerating transoceanic flows, which had been in decline 
since the early eighteenth century. The duration of the transit across the isthmus 
continued to be highly contingent, dependent on the availability of transport, weather 
conditions, and other factors. Historian Aims McGuinness provides a snapshot of the late 
days of the ancient route:  
“[The corridor] was controlled and operated by a distinct group of workers, many of whom were 
also proprietors of the means of transport, including mules and dugout canoes known as bongos. 
The waters in the harbors at Chagres [Caribbean port] and Panama City were too shallow to permit 
oceangoing ships to draw close to shore, and so arriving ships were forced to anchor as far as a 
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mile off the coast. Local boatmen provided transportation from ship to ship using bongos or small 
sailboats. People arriving at the port of Chagres continued up the Chagres River in bongos to the 
town of Gatun or, if waters permitted, to the town of Cruces. Passengers either walked the rest of 
the way or, more commonly, negotiated with still other local men for transportation by mule. 
Travelers also had the option of hiring porters, or ‘cargadores,’ who carried cargo and sometimes 
passengers on their backs using harnesses.”81 
The demands of the local oligarchy for a return to the days of the isthmus serving as an 
imperial route were ultimately fruitful. While Simon Bolivar could not realize his dream 
of Panama becoming the articulating joint of a united continent, during the second-half of 
the nineteenth century, the growing power of transnational capital would reassert its will 
upon landscapes of the neo-tropics. The changing material culture of western society 
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THE RAILROAD YEARS 
 
Starting in the late eighteenth century, an expanding world market created the 
conditions for the mechanization of production, transportation, and communication in the 
Old World. The harnessing of novel energy sources increased the calculus of profitability 
for the capitalist classes in North Atlantic countries. Stephen Bunker claims that “it was 
not until the nineteenth century that the technologies developed and the capital 
accumulated in industrial production fed back into the rapid advances in fossil fuel-driven 
transport, in steel constructed vessels, and frames on steel constructed infrastructure.”82 
This explosion in production generated the conditions for a new wave of capital 
accumulation and population growth, which defined the era of industrial capitalism as 
much as did the mechanization of production. New technologies ushered in new relations 
of production and resource use. Moreover, the new system also signaled a paradigm shift 
in human relations with nature, altering traditional, culture and place-specific balances. 
Industrial capitalism depended on a worldview that reduced non-human nature to its 
productive moment, treating it as a reservoir of commodities.83  
Operating within this conception of nature, Adam Smith asserted that the wealth 
of a nation lies in its ability to produce. David Ricardo extolled the virtues of local 
specialization to engage in competitive, global markets. However, it is doubtful whether 
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they had in mind the type of specialization and production that would be established and 
perpetuated in Panama during the nineteenth century. The area's one-dimensional 
economy and dependence on transit was maintained by blatantly oppressive structures of 
power such as slavery and socially constructed food scarcity. New transportation 
techniques and navigation routes stimulated maritime traffic that bypassed the isthmus. 
Panama’s elites were unable to maintain the logistical relevance of the transit region and 
navigate the grander changes. 
A transnational transformation in the material conditions of transportation in 
general would eventually lead to a revaluation of the isthmus in a changing context. Prior 
to the emergence of modern transportation technologies, following Immanuel 
Wallerstein, “long-distance transfers were generally restricted to preciosities (high value, 
low bulk commodities),” such as silver, spices, and ivory. The extraction of these 
commodities had significant negative ecological consequences in the colonies, but their 
consumption only had a “slight significance for the metabolism of the core.” The mid-
nineteenth century saw the “long-distance exchange of bulk commodities… become 
crucial to the metabolism of some importing countries in Europe.”84 The growing 
interconnection between states not only allowed raw materials and commodities to flow, 
but also “increased the mass of matter and energy transformed by industry,” while at the 
same time intensifying the world-system’s “inherent tendencies to spatial 
concentration.”85  
In this context of unequal and combined development, the consolidation of the 
periphery-status of many of the world’s regions, such as Latin America where liberal 
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republicanism stood as a shoddy façade, defined the direction of flows of this new world 
system. New technologies ushered in a new stage in human-nature relations in European 
societies and their diasporas throughout the world. New mechanistic attitudes toward 
nature coincided with imperialistic social attitudes held by decision-making elites. These 
patterns of imperial behavior had grave implications for the political ecology of the 
isthmus due to its close proximity to a burgeoning U.S. “Panama would no longer be the 
isthmus of Seville, Cadiz, or even Jamaica,” Jaen Suarez explains, “The North Atlantic 
powers would rapidly succeed them. Panama would become the isthmus of New York.”86   
Throughout the nineteenth century, the U.S. continued to march west following its 
imperial banner of Manifest Destiny, continuing a federally-led, violent spatial expansion 
and territorial dispossession of indigenous lands. This westward migration can be 
understood as a micro-globalization in its own right, a safety-valve to deflate mounting 
regional tensions over slavery and ensure uninterrupted profits to its capitalist class. The 
imposition of the U.S. dollar as a universal, gold-backed currency over the vast territory 
was only accomplished due to the growth of the central government during this period.  
The discovery of gold in California in 1848 created a pull factor for get-rich quick 
oriented masses of different origins. Multiple paths across Central America started to 
figure in the American imaginary as routes to reach the west coast of the U.S. Panama 
was chosen over a Nicaragua to provide a railroad link for maritime passengers. A 
tortuous overland route across the American Great Plains and West highlighted the 
Panama option as a safer, more convenient way to shorten the trek. The availability of 
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steamships, which appeared on the Pacific following the annexation of Oregon in 1847,87 
meant that currents or traditional sailing ills no longer conditioned navigation to the same 
degree. Besides being the de-facto path for fortune-seeking migrants, the route that 
developed was also exploited by Pacific South American countries to cheapen their 
shipping costs to Europe and the Caribbean. 
Efforts to build an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua and the geopolitical 
paradigm at the time resulted in the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer treaty between the U.S. and 
Great Britain, compelling both countries not to occupy, fortify, colonize, or otherwise 
exercise domination over Central America. Although there were no Latin American 
signatories to the treaty, the construction of an interoceanic canal or railway by foreign 
capital was effectively prohibited in the region. The failure of the Colombian capitalist 
class to muster enough capital meant that a national venture could not be launched to 
renew the interoceanic corridor in any form. 
The liberal and modernizing outlook of many Latin American elites enabled 
American capital to become a major agent of landscape and social change. The early 
industrial revolution in the US had generated extreme concentrations of capital in a few 
hands, and these assets became increasingly important in regional diplomacy. In 1846, 
the Mallarino-Bidlack treaty between New Granada and the US granted rights of way 
across the isthmus to the US. An American corporation, the Pacific Mail Steamship 
Company, won a bid and was awarded a land monopoly to construct a railroad. The 
director of Pacific Mail, William H. Aspinwall, was one of these outward-looking barons, 
                                                          




and would promote the Panama Railroad Company as the chief organizer of the 
construction of the railroad line from 1850 to 1855. 
Following the collapse of the Spanish fleet and fair system in 1739, the 
interoceanic route had fallen into disuse and relative neglect. As historian Aims 
McGuiness writes, “transportation across Panama at the beginning of the gold rush was 
still highly decentralized.”88 The early gold-rush conveyance of immigrants, gold, and 
letters from the U.S. across the transit region was controlled by small operators with at 
most a few mules or bongos. Due to the demand for rapid transportation and the archaic 
infrastructure, McGuiness notes that from 1848 to 1852, the history of Panama’s transit 
system was marked by the transformation “from a locally controlled network powered 
primarily by human beings, mules, currents, and the wind to a more centralized and 
largely US- owned ships and locomotives powered by steam.”89  
However, the takeover of interoceanic communication in the transit region was 
not completed overnight. The railroad technocratic elite first had to “wrest control of 
Panama’s transit system from the boatmen, muleteers, washerwomen, and others in 
Panama who also saw the potential to profit from the great migration to the goldfields.”90 
But instead of just a social reorganization of labor associated with the route, the railroad 
entailed a limited transformation of landscapes in the transit region to better adapt its 
environs integrally to the new flow. Aspinwall’s plans included the construction of a 
whole new terminal town on the Caribbean coast. The modern city of Colon,91 located on 
a peninsula on Limon Bay west of Portobelo, traces its origins to this perceived need. 
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Due to the abundant rainfall of the Caribbean slope, its lowland soils were saturated with 
water. The need for construction material put pressure on the transit region’s mangroves. 
On the Caribbean side of the railroad, its terminal and course were to be located in 
swamp territory, requiring the first ever large-scale filling of wetlands in the isthmus.  
The city of Colon did not attain considerable population size until the mid-
twentieth century,92 but its establishment along an almost straight line from Panama City 
was necessary for the railroad’s effective annihilation of space through time. Panama 
City, where mule trains were laden in the plaza during the Spanish years, remained the 
Pacific terminal and “was dramatically transformed into a crowded place of frenzied 
commerce and breathless anticipation.”93 Although at the time it was not much more than 
an isolated Pacific outpost due to the decline in importance of the transit region, it 
quickly became a cosmopolitan center where varied travelers congregated while waiting 
for their steamer for San Francisco.  
A restive state of social metabolism yielded to the vicissitudes of transnational 
capital, which summoned boiler iron bridges, culverts, and trestles to the transit region’s 
landscape and waterscapes. The company was given a great amount of land to use for the 
route. Implementing the company’s vision required the migration of a transnational labor 
force – including “coolies,” Irishmen, Jamaicans, among others – who fell at a 50-80% 
mortality rate during the construction period.94 The construction of the interoceanic 
railroad was a monumental task for its time, and required new forms of social and labor 
organization. The environment posed vexing engineering challenges, as the tracks passed 
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over mountains and through former wetlands.  Over 300 bridges and culverts were 
constructed along the route, representing a significant intervention in local ecosystems. 
Besides the astronomical death rate and hideous working conditions, the railway’s 
completion was further complicated by the fact that most woods rotted in this climate and 
thus did not make good material for tiles. While the ballasting for the tracks was 
completed throughout the entire line of the road, the spruce, pine, and native wood ties 
decayed rapidly.95 It was not until the discovery of the properties of the black guayacum 
(Lignum vitae) that the builders obtained a tropical hardwood with the necessary strength, 
toughness, and density to overcome the heat and humidity. The logs were brought from 
Colombia, and their formidable hardness meant that construction required drilling the ties 
before the spikes could be nailed.96  
Construction of the railroad’s Atlantic section had to contend with the obstacles 
posed by the tortuous Rio Chagres. George Muirson Totten, chief engineer of the project, 
complained about the area where the Rio Chagres’ tributaries ran closer to the “upper part 
of the Rio Grande” which “presented a wild, broken country, with sharp projecting hills, 
and deep ravines.” The cuts in this area “contained large quantities of rock.” Nonetheless, 
the Pacific section builders found an ally in the Rio Grande valley. Muirson Totten 
moves from a lengthy account of how the line traversed the Caribbean slope to describing 
its course across the continental divide to the Pacific: 
The line passes the summit ridge by a cut one quarter of a mile in length, and twenty-four feet in 
greatest depth; and then strikes the head-waters of the Rio Grande…. Following the left bank of 
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this stream… the line crosses the Rivers Pedro Miguel, Caimitillo, and Cardenas, near their 
entrance into the Rio Grande; thence it stretches across the Savannas of Corasal [sic], and the 
swamps of Corendu [sic], and cuts through the spur of the hill Ancon… reach[ing] the Pacific 
Ocean at Playa Prieta, in the northern suburb of the city of Panama.97  
Moreover, he claims that “From the crossing of Pedro Miguel to the Pacific Terminus, 
the work was generally of a light character—the line being down upon the river flats.”98 
 The Panama Railroad’s selected route, almost paralleling the colonial mule roads 
leading to the fluvial port in the Rio Chagres, meant that, as Tejeira Davis explains, the 
Rio Grande stopped being a “backwater” to the human flows of the transit region.99 The 
colonial routes were always separated by swamps from the river, but the facility afforded 
by riverbanks to railroad engineers brought the ‘iron horse’ to its alluvial lands, changing 
the character of the former strictly agricultural valley. 
The first complete voyage between termini ran in 1855, and the effective transit 
time across the isthmus was reduced to about a half day, if one had the dollars to afford it.  
Despite the steamers and trains’ dependence on coal, the functioning of the corridor 
continued to rely on draft animal power. Mules energized the unloading, loading, and 
coaling of ships at the wharves; ships, carrying up to two or three tons of cargo and the 
luggage of 700 travelers, were stevedored in as little as two hours. The railroad`s 
profitability and traffic volume restored the area’s distinctive transithmian economy. The 
first years of full-length operation were shaped by competition between different 
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steamship companies, but gradually the Pacific Steamship Company consolidated a 
transit monopoly.100 
Rail technology gave humans unprecedented power over space and time.101 The 
rail-steamship route made it easier to get from Panama to California than to Panama’s 
contemporary capital, Bogota, which lay distant on a 2200 meter high moorland.102 The 
environmental impact and degree of landscape change entailed by the railroad exceeded 
that of the overland-fluvial route monopolized by the Spanish. Besides a new 
passageway, the first transcontinental railroad created a “new axis of settlement,” with a 
train station being built every four miles on average along the tracks. The last station 
before reaching the Pacific was named “Rio Grande Station,” located close to the river’s 
confluence with its tributary the Rio Cardenas, northwest of Panama City.103 
The transit region’s prolonged and problematic position within transnational 
networks of migration and accumulation had long-lasting consequences. Panama became 
a necessary land bridge for Americans trying to reach the newest and most promising 
territories under Washington’s jurisdiction. The railroad line was established parallel to 
the Spanish mule road, with its sustaining local cattle economy sprawling into the urban 
hinterland. The route effectively perpetuated the territorial organization of Panama in 
function of the interoceanic corridor’s demands, and split, at least culturally, the 
cohesiveness of the Colombian isthmus of Panama.  
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The Panama Railroad era was of the earliest and most significant encounters 
between tropical Central America and the U.S.. Under the terms of the Mallarino-Bidlack 
treaty, American troops landed routinely on the railroad region to maintain the desired 
level of stability among the passageway’s domestic rebels and civilians. However, 
traversing Panama put gold-hungry and entrepreneurial Americans in contact with the 
‘natives.’ This early encounter is historically significant because it gave Americans early 
images of later (virtual) neo-colonial subjects.  
The racist and white prevailing supremacist ideologies prevailing in U.S.’s 
Antebellum culture shaped early accounts of Panamanians. A discourse on the tropical 
world had begun to take form in North Atlantic societies, especially in temperate Europe. 
This new perception of the tropics defined the Neotropical world by juxtaposing it with 
Europe; its climates, peoples, vegetation, and diseases posed a threat to the sub-tropical 
normalcy. Ideas about race accompanied this assessment of the darker biome, later 
reinforced by the systematization of a Social Darwinist worldview in the North American 
academy. As Nueva Granada first fell under the influence of the United States, this new 
way of perceiving tropical ecosystems found its way to the isthmus’ cultural scene. 
Moreover, according to Stephen Frenkel, the category of the tropics in the specifically 
American social and environmental imaginary, was born, or at least greatly shaped during 
the construction and operation of the railroad. This culture of nature transposed to the 
Panamanian tropics brought along an ideological baggage that would help legitimate 
further intervention in Panama and possibly elsewhere in tropical America. 104  
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After the completion of the railroad, the isthmus, still a part of New Granada, 
received the scholarly attention of American natural scientists, as would other narrow 
areas of Central America during the search for a feasible waterway site. This 
development was part of a major reconnaissance of lands previously uncharted by whites 
throughout the world. Between 1870 and 1873, an American expedition led by Lieutenant 
Thomas O. Selfridge, enlisting G. A. Maack as chief geologist, was entrusted with 
scouting Panama’s potential for a possible canal route.  Although not without alternatives 
and political squabbling, the isthmus of Panama’s legitimacy as a viable site for the first 

















THE FRENCH CANAL 1880 – 1894 
 
North Atlantic societies in the Old World shared a neoclassical notion of 
hydraulic engineering dating back to the eighteenth century. In this Enlightenment 
tradition, the “‘proper’ channel for a river is not necessarily the one it has carved for 
itself: By means of canals and locks it can be guided by men [sic] along a straight and 
level line.”105 During the nineteenth century, industrialized nations were able to develop 
networks of navigation canals connecting their territory to a degree unprecedented in 
human history. However, natural geologic processes and colonialist expansion had 
determined that the dreamed interoceanic canal would have to be built through 
Neotropical territory, where many cultures still held to pre-industrial, non-capitalist 
patterns of water and resource use. The construction and control of an interoceanic canal 
would be an important asset in an emerging imperial scene in which the domination of 
nature through technology granted economic benefits and international prestige.  
In the mid-nineteenth century, “modern transportation and communication 
systems,” writes historian Jessica Teisch, “helped set our modern world in motion.”106 
Social metabolism between mankind and nature accelerated following gradual changes 
accruing in the repertoire of western environmental management. Applied forms of 
scientific knowledge— especially civil engineering, fluid mechanics, and hydraulics— 
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increased mankind’s capacity to transform landscapes with engineering works of 
unprecedented scale. By the 1870’s, coal had overtaken charcoal as the main fuel for 
producing iron products, while western metropoles had adapted to the potential of oil and 
natural gas as energy sources. Furthermore, Teisch claims that beyond a quantitative 
intensification of interconnectedness, “the application of iron, steel, and fossil fuels to 
industry, transportation, and communication changed the way that people and nations 
interacted.”107  
The construction of an interoceanic canal would require the cultural diffusion of 
these technologies from the center to the periphery of the world system. A growing faith 
in the progressive, transformative power of technology ensured a receptive response to 
this transmission from neocolonial elites. The social contexts that nurtured the emergence 
of modern hydraulics were imbued in the nature and applications of these knowledges, 
bringing along a new host of contradictions to the colonial world. Moreover, these 
technologies enabled the large-scale transfiguring of nature into natural capital, 
introducing ‘new’ ecosystems into transnational systems of profit and empire-making 
schemes. For example, within the cultural philosophy of the era’s hydraulic science laid a 
fundamental contradiction between sustainability and continued capital accumulation, in 
addition to environmental assumptions about Neotropical hydrology.108  
 In 1869, the same year a man-made waterway once again linked the Red and 
Mediterranean seas cutting through the mostly desertic Isthmus of Suez, Mexico City 
would launch the construction of its long awaited Gran Canal, a massive artificial body 
                                                          
107 Ibid. 
108 As Carse puts it, “Engineered technologies are embedded with this historical assumptions about 




of water to address the city’s everlasting sewage problem. The advent of the Second 
Industrial Revolution coincided with the Porfiriato, Mexico’s prolonged nation-making 
dictatorship. Besides the British capital and financial backing, both projects were 
examples of similar statist projects boasting of their nation’s triumph over nature. Late 
nineteenth century Mexico City’s efforts to address endemic floods brought the first 
steam shovels and massive dredges to Latin America. These massive, mobile machines 
were the largest ever employed by humans.109 The use of heavily capitalized technology 
to exert a particular human vision over nature also requires similarly forceful 
manipulation of laborers, as the hydraulic society thesis would maintain. Mexican 
historian Luis Aboites calls the decade of the 1880s “the Great Hydraulic” era, a process 
in which hydrological resources were to be exploited as a condition for the flourishing 
foreign direct investment in Latin America.110 This regional process of change illustrates 
the fact that as ‘man’ attempted to assert control over nature, he had to do so over his 
fellow brothers and sisters first. 
The French were the first to attempt the hydrologic holy grail of merging the 
world’s oceans at the isthmus’ waist. The best route to attempt a sea-level canal, it was 
determined, was located in the historic transit region. Through the eyes of foreign canal-
building engineers and entrepreneurs, the appreciation of the natural world, and tropical 
ecosystems especially, is reduced to appraising single elements of nature for their 
potential economic value. Seen from an industrial-hydraulic perspective, the isthmus is 
thus abstracted and compartmentalized down to its physical and hydrologic elements, 
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rendering it an exploitable geo-hydrological canvass. It featured four main longitudinal 
ridges. Two of these run parallel to the coasts and the other two down the middle of the 
landmass. The area’s topography features three valleys, “not unlike the spaces between 
the fingers of a man’s hand,” which are “practically continuous except where eroded 
through by the Isthmian streams.”111 This condition left “four fundamental engineering 
ways” for the construction of a deep water canal: 
 A sea-level cutting from ocean to ocean through the four ridges  
 Sea-level sections at each end and a high lake between the two central ridges 
 Lakes in the two valleys next the coasts and a cutting through the central ridges 
 Lakes in each of the three basins112 
Early in the planning stage, it became clear that the largest task at hand was how to 
win control and manipulate the region’s rivers, in addition to piercing the continental 
divide at its lowest point. The projected line was crossed by the unruly Chagres River 
twenty-eight between Gamboa and Colon, and thirteen times by the Rio Grande between 
Culebra and Panama. “To prevent these rivers from entering the canal and to avoid the 
currents and dangers of overflow that would otherwise follow, channels or derivations are 
cut,” an American engineer analyzing the French effort in hindsight explains, “to 
accommodate the waters of the rivers and to carry them to the sea in beds on each side of 
the canal.”113 The stage of ecological science and environmental thought in the nineteenth 
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century, however, did not recognize that diverting water from natural streams and rivers 
caused irreparable damage to riparian wetlands.114 
The Rio Grande figured prominently in French plans for a sea-level canal, and 
also in their later remedial plans to build a lock-canal. The Rio Grande’s basin had to be 
conquered, although the challenge would not be as difficult as the taming of the 
formidable Chagres. Paralleling the railroad, the northwest-southeast line drawn by 
engineers across the transit region’s slopes intercepted the axes of both rivers, from the 
point where they debouch from the highlands and turn toward the oceans. Partial 
derivation and damming of the Rio Grande was an important part of the work done by the 
Pacific section of the construction crew.115 On a hill close to the river’s middle basin, the 
French began the erection of a dike on the west bank. The dike was the beginning of a 
proposed dam to enclose a harbor close to Panama City, and would help “close these little 
rivers and have the main entrance at La Boca.”116 Besides riverine sedimentation, 
particles carried by ocean currents could also obstruct the Southern navigation and access 
channel. The shallow harbor and tidal conditions at Panama Bay were to be addressed 
with a tidal lock, which never materialized.117 French engineers never fully grasped the 
hydraulic challenge posed by the Rio  
Around 20, 000 workers, almost all from the West Indies, came to labor on the 
effort. The need to provide potable water to the workforce necessitated the creation of 
reservoirs, since no natural lakes existed in the transit region. The Rio Grande Reservoir 
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was built in the upper part of the river between 1882 and 1889, covering an area of 72.77 
acres.118 The French intended to use the area’s abundance of precipitation in their favor, 
even if the choice of a sea-level canal hindered a more utilitarian approach of hydrologic 
features. Although the Panamanian Cordillera reaches its lowest point in East Central 
Panama, it doesn’t completely fade; thus, a canal would inevitably have to traverse a 
mountainous spine; the obstinate will to claw a sea-level canal between the seas ignored 
the isthmus topography and geology 
In the lower Rio Grande, at La Boca, the French erected the necessary works for 
the construction of dredges and other machinery. The prevailing miasma theory 
governing disease epidemics, which linked “illness to the exposure to vapors emanating 
from marshes rife with rotting vegetation,”119 shaped the appreciation of lowland fluvial 
landscapes. John Bigelow, an American observer of the French effort, described the 
infrastructure at the mouth of the Rio Grande as “constantly exposed to the pestilential 
exhalations of the mangrove swamps through which that stream finds its way to the sea, 
and through the bed of which the canal is expected to flow. To keep up the force requisite 
for the mechanical operations to be carried on at this point,” Bigelow surmised, “will 
prove extremely difficult, on account of its insalubrity.”120  
The attempt to build a sea-level canal, like Ferdinand de Lesseps had done at 
Suez, doomed the Canal from the start. Malaria and yellow fever did not distinguish 
between Antillean Creole or Parisian engineer, and as the vectors of these tropical 
diseases were given more range to expand with the excavations, the result was 
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approximately 22,000 work-place casualties. The state of science and technology at the 
time meant that the French did not a proper understanding of the public health and 
engineering obstacles at hand.  
De Lesseps had planned a sea-level canal and pursued it at appalling human costs. 
The physical reality was that the topography and character of Panama were wildly 
different from that of the sandy dunes conquered in Egypt. Skyrocketing mortality, heavy 
rains, an earthquake, and mudslides hindered excavations. The deforestation, explosion-
aided excavations, wetland transformation, and social change brought about by the 
French project all helped establish Panama as the definitive setting of this millennial 
dream of uniting the oceans, while smirching its name in the Old World for good. The 
corruption-laden collapse of the French enterprise created popularized the word 
Panamiste (Panama) as a synonym for graft and corruption in Europe, discouraging other 
powers from retaking the project.121 The failure even helped bring down one of France’s 
hero, de Lesseps, and the Third Republic.122 
The French project of linking the two coasts of Colombia’s isthmus of Panama 
occurred at a time when the market economy and modernization was straining the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and post-colonial states throughout Latin 
America. These relations became particularly contentious toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, as export booms throughout the region exacerbated encroachment 
upon indigenous territories. The Pacific coastal region, spanning 11,300 kilometers from 
Panama to Ecuador was home to the one of the largest black Latin American population, 
and was left after emancipation a relatively autonomous peasantry. During the same 
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period, the larger Caribbean region roughly from Cartagena to Colon was home to an 
independent peasantry that was being increasingly marginalized by the expansion of 
cattle ranching. Leal and Van Ausdal assert that “black people there achieved more 
autonomy than almost anywhere in the Americas, and developed an egalitarian society 
thanks to a rainforest economy that did not rest exclusively on land and cutting down the 
forest.” However, the liberal, export-oriented land-use regimes depended on destroying 
tropical rain and dry forests for monocultures,123 painting a dire future for the continuity 
of these communities.  
The French vision for a waterway, just like the railroad preceding it, did not 
presuppose the control of non-essential lands for the flow of transisthmian traffic. The 
French had acquired the rights for an interoceanic canal from Nueva Granada (Gran 
Colombia), but had not requested autonomous sovereignty over any adjoining land 
proper, and relied mostly on personal fortunes to subsidize the ill-fated project. Despite 
their imperial tradition, the French did not have demonstrable colonial objectives in the 
transit region. Marixa Lasso argues from an analysis of cartographic representations of 
the project, the French did not have plans to claim any land beyond the projected 
waterway’s bed, their maps projecting a canal line drawn with exclusively navigational 
goals and respectful of local settlements along the line. Moreover, Panamanian elites had 
no reason to fear a takeover of territory due to the excavation of a sea-level canal funded 
by small bondholders. French engineering maps, as Lasso keenly observes, portrayed the 
canal line as embedded in a human-inhabited transit region, crisscrossing populated 
landscapes, and conveyed a “sense of continuity between the canal and previous historic 
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uses of the transit route.”124 The towns of the transit region, including some of colonial 
rigins and others whose roots trace back to the railroad era, were adequately represented 
and factored into construction.125  
In the second half of the nineteenth century, population began to grow with a 
renewed vigor in the isthmus. By 1880, the population finally reached pre-conquest 
levels, but only a small fraction lived in the transit region. “Despite the amount of activity 
that these works inspired,” Stanley Heckadon argues, “changes to the environment were 
confined to the immediate surroundings of the towns and camps which sprang up along 
the railroad line or near the excavations for the canal.”126 Beyond the studies done for the 
railroad, the U.S.-led surveys of potential routes, and studies accompanying the French 
attempt to build a waterway, the isthmus geography remained unknown for North 
Atlantic societies. After the failed French effort, more geologists and, for the first time, 
paleontologists arrived in Panama.127 
After their machinery rusted under the humid heat, and a chunk of the Rio 
Chagres´ basin had been deforested by machete, Culebra still stood 59 meters on top of 
the soil supposed to be carved. The Rio Grande was an important component of the 
French effort (1881 - 1897), and a significant part of its course was to serve as the main 
channel in the Pacific slope. The incomplete derivation and damming of the upper Rio 
Grande were the first major transgressions on the physical integrity of the watershed, 
despite millennia of human dwelling. 
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THE “BIG STICK” 
 
It was not until the Second Industrial Revolution matured that human culture 
developed the capacity to stop nearly any river, no matter how mighty. The structural use 
of concrete became a common practice in Western engineering, to a degree not seen since 
the times of the Romans.128 Throughout the Caribbean, during the initial period of the 
formation of a working class, foreign capital was increasingly being directed towards 
large, extractive infrastructure projects, bent on tapping into the traditionally agrarian 
region’s natural capital.129 Similar to the era of the California Gold Rush and the Panama 
Railroad,  developments and historical forces operating within the U.S. are essential for 
unpacking environmental change in early twentieth century central Panama.  
During the first decades of the twentieth century, North Atlantic states came to 
control an overwhelming majority of world space.130 The U.S. shared the colonial 
impulse of the great powers at the time, and American expansionism found clear 
expression in the manhandling of Spain and takeover of colonies as far as the Philippines. 
The Gilded Age period in late nineteenth century U.S. history witnessed the closing of a 
once seemingly inexhaustible internal frontier, one that had an important effect on 
American society and shaped its relationship with nature through the concept of 
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“wilderness.” The closing of this frontier posed a de-facto spatial barrier for 
uninterrupted capital accumulation. John Soluri points to the “increasing availability of 
once ‘exotic’ and expensive goods produced in the tropics” as representing “an everyday 
sign of rising U.S. hegemony in tropical Asia and Latin America.”131 However, a “strictly 
mercantilist view,” Alexander Missal argues, “does not suffice as an explanation for U.S. 
policies abroad and their support at home around the end of the nineteenth century.”132  
The overseas expansion of the U.S. was galvanized by intellectuals and policy 
makers who systematized an outwardly looking popular sentiment. For the purposes of 
environmental change in Panama, the most important of these thinkers, beside Theodore 
Roosevelt, was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan (1849 - 1914); his views are expounded in 
his 1890 landmark study, The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Rather than a 
monument to global commerce and cooperation, the Panama Canal was conceived as a 
symbol of authority and power, its main utility being that of ensuring the advantage in 
mobility to U.S. warships. The logic of foreign military post establishment, which took 
the form of grand scale military bases during this period of industrialized warfare, was an 
intrinsic part of the neocolonial project, and thus an important determinant for the need of 
building an interoceanic waterway and acquiring rights to adjoining land. A mercantilist 
impulse, compounded by a military desire to project power, put American society at an 
imperial crossroads. 
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 During the late nineteenth century, the development of landscape and 
environmental management in the U.S. was an element of the emergence of a new liberal 
state, as the government responded to social and conservation problems at home and 
abroad.133 Population growth and a developing environmental awareness coincided with 
advances in technology, medicine, and empire building, enabling qualitative changes to 
the nation’s environment making practices. These developments were preconditions for 
even attempting to encroach into tropical America and to alter the waterscapes to the 
extent necessary for the isthmian canal. The geographic and cultural juxtaposition of the 
U.S. and the tropical world made the tropical biome “the dominant environmental 
imaginary of extracontinental U.S. expansion, just as wilderness was for continental 
expansion.”134 American cultural attitudes toward nature and the non-human world were 
embodied in its pragmatic and reductionist hydraulic technique. The influence of this 
technological assemblage upon landscapes, both social and biophysical, would 
increasingly impinge upon Central American and Caribbean spaces during the early 
twentieth century. 
In 1902, the Conservative victory in the civil war known as the Thousand Day’s 
War, which engulfed Colombian national affairs and had devastating effects on the 
isthmus, compelled T.R. to take drastic measures to assert his imperial vision.  Roosevelt 
resorted to American exceptionalism, recently enshrined in the Platt Amendment; by 
doing so, the U.S. employed a RealPolitik-driven, empire-building approach to 
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appropriating the space for the route. The executive branch instigated an oligarchic revolt 
on the isthmus. In order to secure the territory surrounding the canal, the U.S. intervened 
in Panamanian politics in 1903 in order to incite a revolution that (successfully) broke 
ties with Bogotá and established a nominally independent Panama. The result was an 
“independent” state, in the purest nominal sense, standing as a brazen compromise 
between native and foreign elites masked in the contemporary façade of banana 
republics.  
The result of U.S. intransigence, the infamous Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, 
did not boast a single Panamanian signee, granted extraordinary power and jurisdiction to 
the U.S. in the isthmus to build the canal. Due to the weakness of the route’s host 
country, the American canal intelligentsia could alter the very demographics of Panama, 
if deemed necessary to meet the logistical and managerial challenge of constituting a 
labor force in a sparsely inhabited former Colombian province.135 The U.S.’s continental 
expansion had been built on a foundation of ethnic cleansing, slavery, and white 
supremacy. This legacy would be central to the American imposed modes of social and 
labor organization associated with canal construction, an imprint that ran deeper than in 
most company towns throughout Central and Latin America or the Caribbean.  
The proximity of oppressed West Indians in the Caribbean provided a pool of 
workers that made the bulk of the workers that ultimately dug the big ditch. Racist 
attitudes shaped the construction period and the management of the project. The U.S. 
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created an effective colony within the isthmus, enabled mainly by domestic collaboration 
and asymmetric power relations. The Americans deemed the isthmus’ labor and 
productive forces at the beginning of canal construction as inappropriate in myriad ways. 
The U.S. formed a global labor force in the Zone, which eventually reached upwards of 
42,000 workers, exceeding far the number enlisted in the republic´s banana monocultures 
and rivalling the infrastructure overhaul of Cuba´s sugar industry or the establishment of 
the Venezuelan oil industry during the same period.136 
Although at the outset of the U.S. effort the intent was to build a sea-level canal 
resembling French designs, the project shifted to a lock and lake based canal soon 
thereafter. The hydraulics of the Panama Canal and the endeavor to wrest control over the 
Río Chagres has received recent scholarly attention. The insights of these researchers are 
especially useful to understand the hydraulic transformation of the Rio Grande valley. 
Castro Herrera argues that, for the cultural group that envisioned the canal and arranged 
for its construction, the most salient element of the natural order was the coincidence of a 
series of biophysical circumstances — geographic location, topography, climate, 
hydrography. The lessons of the French effort and the American pragmatic approach to 
hydraulics enabled the adoption of a “technological solution” capable of parlaying into 
advantages what hitherto had been the waterway’s greatest obstacles: heavy tropical 
precipitation patterns, and a difficult topography.137 Ashley Carse’s work, exploring the 
“historical relations between canal administration and the diverse human communities 
living in the surrounding region,” reminds U.S. that the Panama Canal, similar to other 
assemblages of “natural infrastructure,” “has been constructed across human groups who 
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know and interact with the forest in different ways.” Central Panama’s forests, and by 
extension its rivers, were “landscapes already morally, economically, and ecologically 
bound up in agrarian life.”138  
Paul Sutter argues that aspects of the U.S.’s environmental management in the 
isthmus worked against imperial interests, mainly those espoused by the Isthmian Canal 
Commission’s (I.C.C.) sanitation campaign to eradicate the carriers of deadly tropical 
fevers. Although these diseases were endemic to the region and had already helped defeat 
one effort at a waterway, “the conditions that produced mosquitoes were not intrinsic to 
tropical nature per se but resulted from the human-caused environmental disturbances 
that accompanied canal building.”139 The immediate consequence of much of the changes 
on the landscape were catastrophic, as mosquitoes thrived in stagnant pools of water in 
humid construction sites cleared of vegetation. “This realization,” Sutter observes, “did 
not mesh well with an American ideology of tropical triumphalism premised on the 
notion that Americans had conquered unalloyed tropical nature in Panama.”140  
Whereas the French had blamed the winds of the sea, eating apples, or the jungle 
vapors for their deaths, the U.S. effort was undertaken after the development of the germ 
theory in the 1890`s, opening the door for the novel idea of insect transmission to gain 
acceptance among Progressives. This scientific leap uncovered mosquitoes as the vectors 
of yellow fever and malaria, but its acceptance did not consolidate until years into the 
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construction of the canal, preventing engineers from knowing that most of their 
transformations made the problem worse. William Gorgas’s led a sanitation and 
comprehensive mosquito eradication campaign which permanently lowered the risk of 
contracting a tropical disease in the area, and allowed for the construction to proceed by 
reducing the death rate among white skilled workers.141 Pneumonia and tuberculosis 
continued to ravage West Indian workers unabated. Some of Sutter’s best examples of 
these contradictory environmental management practices were taken from the waterscape 
changes and environmental disturbances that derived from the Rio Grande’s basin 
transformation, the subject of the rest of this section. 
The construction period is divided in three stages reflecting changes in leadership. 
The first stage (1904—1906), headed by American Midwest railroad engineer John 
Findley Wallace, was doomed by uncontrolled tropical diseases and bureaucratic red-tape 
mandated by a stingy I.C.C. The lack of a real plan and knowledge of the hydrologic 
realities condemned this first stage to be a futile attempt to reproduce the French sea-level 
utopia. American observer wanted the venture to ‘Let the Earth Fly,’ and a still token 
workforce struggled to put up digging numbers in vain. Bates gives us a diagnosis of the 
misguided excavation characterizing this phase, during which putting up impressive 
numbers of unearthed tropical soil to ensure continued funding trumped all other 
concerns: 
no spoil was going to the dams. They are too far away. None was going to the railway 
embankments around the lake-to-be; none was going to the breakwaters or valuable reclamations; 
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none to raise Colon. Where? Just to the nearest places, without reference to anything but disposing 
of the output. The putting of tens of millions of cubic yards of spoil into dams and embankments is 
a very different proposition from the procedure of this record-striving exhibition. 
The second stage (1905—1907) the new chief engineer, the builder of Great 
Northern Railway John Frank Stevens, set the priority of constructing the civilian and 
community infrastructure of the Canal Zone before proceeding with letting the earth fly. 
After the personnel, at least the white skilled workers, was materially provided, Stevens 
transformed the project with a railroad engineering approach to canal building which led 
him to implement a rail-based system with shifting tracks that could dispose of the soil 
from excavation and blasting sites, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the novel 
Bucyrus steam shovels.142 Understanding that landslides and heavy rains necessitated 
brisk and orderly disposal of the soil from the sites of excavation, the identification of 
landfill sites to absorb massive amounts of earth was imperative.143 In order to transform 
the landscape and waterscape and erect the massive concrete lock chambers, the U.S. 
brought in: 102 large, railroad-mounted steam shovels, enormous steam-powered cranes 
able to handle concrete, dredges, giant hydraulic rock crushers, pneumatic power drills, 
and cement mixers.  More importantly, the key to construction success would be the 
railway system whose main use was to function as a conveyer belt to move loosened soil 
to places where material could serve U.S. imperial interests: landfills, causeways, earthen 
dams, and others. 
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The plan adopted during this second stage fully displayed the characteristics of a 
“socio-technical system,” constituted by “technical, organizational, scientific, and 
political-legislative components.144” The envisioned canal was a mechanized waterway 
composed of three sets of locks, three dams, a series of reservoirs, and a “network of 
remote hydrographic stations from which measurements of rainfall and changes in river 
and lake elevations from across the watershed are transmitted to a central station.”145 The 
Pacific section of the canal was to feature two set of locks due to the nature of the slope, 
Miraflores and Pedro Miguel locks.146 Temporary construction towns and permanent 
Zonian towns, both gold-rate (for white civilian and military) and silver-rate (for black 
and non-U.S.-born), were to be erected within the valley of the Rio Grande and 
throughout the Canal Zone. The transit region’s savannahs, tropical dry and rainforests, 
and reclaimed wetlands would give way to a logic devoted to the functioning of an ever 
more demanding waterway. 
Ensuring a freshwater supply for the Canal Zone was one of the earliest and most 
defining concerns of the U.S. technocratic regime. It was one of the first tasks taken up 
by the Second Isthmian Canal Commission and considered vital for continued 
construction.  Besides water for lock operation, sanitation for workers remained a priority 
for the American effort, and the plan for the provision of water adopted was a chain of 
reservoirs across the isthmus with mains. There were seven reservoirs in the supply plan, 
                                                          
144 During this stage, T.R. finally approved sufficient funds for Army physician William Gorgas’s radical plan 
to implement the findings of Cuban epidemiologist Carlos Finlay, regarding the mosquito transmission of 
yellow fever, within the Canal Zone and adjoining urban centers. 
145 Carse, “Nature as Infrastructure…,” 545. 




three of which were in the Pacific slope: Rio Grande,147 Ancon Hill, and Cocoli Lake. 
The assemblage of aqueducts and hydrants that accompanied the reservoir enabled an 
unprecedented control of water drainage and distribution, a prerequisite for mounting the 
engineering and logistical effort represented by the canal’s construction. 
U.S. engineers began to overcome the lack of knowledge about the hydrology and 
geology of the route. The fact that the waterway was determined to be a lock-canal that 
would be integrated with the ecosystem services of the area forced technocrats to conduct 
studies of the region.148 In his treatise on The Agricultural Possibilities of the Canal 
Zone, Hugh Hammond Bennett gives us one of the best descriptions of the stream banks:  
“Along the Rio Grande from its mouth to near Corozal and lying between the Panama Railroad 
and the lower slopes of the Ancon and Sosa hills are about 2 square miles of low, flat, alluvial land 
which is subject to overflow and which remains in a permanent soggy condition….The soil is a 
dark colored, very fertile silt loam to clay loam which, with good protection from overflow, such 
as may be secured by the construction of open ditches and dikes, would produce fine crops of rice, 
sugar cane, and probably a variety of vegetables. Heavy applications of lime would likely be 
required to bring this land into favorable condition for healthful plant growth. At present it 
supports a dense growth of mangrove and other water-loving plants.”149 
Bennett asserts that the lands in the western hinterland of Panama City had similar 
productive potential as those of silt loam below Gatun Dam, used by natives for growing 
                                                          
147 The Rio Grande reservoir was the dam initially constructed in the mountainous continental divide by 
the French. Explaining how Panama City was to be provided with potable water, Burr states: “The source 
of public water supply selected for the city of Panama is a reservoir in the upper Rio Grande Valley close 
to the great Culebra Cut and about 1 miles from the city. The dam for this reservoir was constructed in the 
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Aspects of the Panama Canal,” (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), 71-78. 
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traffic, would entail costly constructions of new sets of locks. 
149 Hugh Hammond Bennett, The Agricultural Possibilities of the Canal Zone Pt. 1 (US. Department of 
Agriculture, : Washington, D.C.: 1912). 
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“coconuts, bananas, and other moisture-loving crops.”150 The most common form of 
travel was by canoe along the isthmus shore. Forests featured canoe-ready hardwoods 
such as oaks, lignum vitae, and Santa Maria, as well as a myriad of soft-wooded 
species.151  
While the land-use policies of the Canal Zone were not yet established, the 
hydraulic decisions made by the engineers threatened the continuity of the landscape 
described by Bennett. The 1906 engineers’ report states that, while some rivers were to 
be cut off by dams, “others are to be taken into the canal. They must, however, be 
temporarily diverted during the excavation of the canal; and in the case of the Rio Grande 
this involves a tunnel seven-eights of a mile long.”152 
The transformation of the waterscape truly reached a grander scale during the 
third stage of construction (1907—1914), under the military leadership of Army officer 
George Goethals. Despite its advantageous orientation, the Río Grande was a “silt 
bearing stream” hindering navigation in parts of its course. Its bed was composed of mud, 
coral, sand and multiple varieties of clay. Nonetheless, U.S. engineers were determined to 
stop the silt of the Río Grande valley from reaching the Pacific, and subsume its valley 
into the most important artificial strait in the world. The rest of this section will explain 
how the valley’s landscapes were radically transformed during the canal’s construction 
and first decades of operation, when engineers completely transformed the Rio Grande’s 
watershed, from its upper and middle basins down to the estuary in its coastal mouth. The 
same environmental problems that doomed the French afflicted the American effort, but 
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rapid developments in science, technology, and managerial organization of workers 
increased its chances to succeed. 
The upper Rio Grande near its headwaters was virtually annexed to the Rio 
Chagres via the narrow Culebra Cut through the continental divide.  The Culebra Cut 
captured the Rio Grande’s waters for Gatun Lake, virtually uniting two distinct 
watersheds.  The railroad conveyor belt was crucial in getting the unwanted earth out of 
the way in this continental divide. Throughout the strait, mountains were transformed to 
reduce their gradient, preventing devastating land and mud slides. The carving of Gaillard 
cut, as it was originally called by the U.S. engineers, had a traumatic effect on West 
Indian workers due to historic mortality rates. The Rio Grande reservoir, close to 
Culebra, was drained by a spillway, and the eponymous, temporary town of Rio Grande 
was dismantled in 1910.  
Beginning in the vicinity of the stream’s junction with the Rio Pedro Miguel, the 
Rio Grande entered its middle basin, where its meandering course carved fertile 
lowlands. In some locations, the bed of the Rio Grande was linear enough that the I.C.C. 
was able to straighten and incorporate it into the canal. The Pedro Miguel locks, the first 
set encountered upon crossing the Cordillera from the Caribbean toward the Pacific, 
admits water from Gatun Lake, connecting the two largest oceans for human purposes.  It 
is around this area that the Rio Grande starts to form a clear axis with the Rio Chagres. 
The Rio Grande valley proved instrumental in cheapening the conquering of the 
Pacific slope.153 The lake on the Pacific slope, Miraflores Lake, was to be created by 
                                                          
153 “From Pedro Miguel to Miraflores, 1.5 miles, the descent is more gradual and the valley of the Rio 
Grande is followed. At Miraflores, the Rio Grande valley is but little above sea and is bordered by 
highlands on each side nearly to the Gulf of Panama. The distance to the gulf shore from Miraflores is 
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damming and diverting the Rio Grande in the area between the old town sites and 
present-day lock sites of Pedro Miguel154 further north and Miraflores.155 Engineer H.F. 
Hodges explains: 
“The lock and dams at Miraflores form a barrier closing the lower Rio Grande Valley and 
retaining the intermediate level of Miraflores Lake…. The lake receives the flow of the Cocoli, 
Pedro Miguel, Caimitillo, and Cameron[sic] rivers, all small streams formerly tributary to the Rio 
Grande. In the rainy seasons the discharge of these streams may be considerable, but in the dry 
season it reduces to a small amount… The main supply of this lake then is the water let down from 
the summit level when passing vessels through Pedro Miguel lock.”156 
The elongated and voluminous lake was more conducive to maritime traffic than the Rio 
Grande’s course, since its meandering middle course and shallow bed posed challenges 
for American engineers.157 A dam was located in the west side of this new lake “to 
complement the surrounding hills and enclose the lake. The flow from the Rio Grande 
and Pedro Miguel Rivers, and one or two other smaller streams, also enters the lake.” The 
dam’s design also presented spillways to capture the flow of tributaries to “prevent the 
water from giving trouble in the valley below the locks.”158 During the lake’s 
construction, the Rio Grande’s tidal interaction necessitated the erection of dike “to 
protect the pit against flooding by the tidal waters in the river bed:”159 
                                                                                                                                                                             
about 5.5 miles.” Engineering and Contracting 41, vol. 1 (Chicago: Myron C. Clark Publishing Company, 
1914), 27. 
154 Ibid. 
155 The old town site, a lake, a landfill, and a set of locks all share the name ‘Miraflores.’ 
156H.F. Hodges, “General Design of the Locks, Dams and Regulating Works of the Panama Canal,” in The 
Panama Canal II: Design and Erection of Structures, Transactions of the International Engineering 
Congress (1916), 45. 
157 "The line from Pedro Miguel on was practically a straight line to deep water in the Gulf of Panama." 
Engineering and Contracting 41, 27. 
158 Reuben Edwin Bakenhus, The Panama Canal, vol. 2, Institute Proceedings 39 (United States Naval 
Institute, 1913), 650; Excavating Contractor 1913- 1914, vol. 10 (1913), 133. 
159 Excavating Contractor 1913- 1914, 15 
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“This dike, composed of a trestle fill of rock and earth, prevented the water from the sealevel 
channel from entering the steam shovel cut 5,000 feet long, 500 feet Wide, and 4-6 feet below 
mean tide, extending to Miraflores Locks.160 
The Miraflores locks, a twin-chamber set of twin locks abutting the spillway, was/is the 
southern terminus of the lake. From Miraflores, “a channel 150 ft. wide with side slopes 
of 1 on 3 was to be excavated to La Boca.”161 The lake allowed the construction of a 
hydroelectric power substation and a water purifying plant to supply the Canal Zone’s 
and Panama City’s needs.162   
 On August 23, 1913, the Rio Grande, which had been temporarily diverted, was 
“turned into” the pit created by the earthen dike soon to become Miraflores Lake.163 The 
artificial lake logically had negative environmental consequences- albeit in a smaller 
scale than those caused by the creation of Gatun Lake in the Caribbean. Besides 
submerging 1.6 miles of fluvial lands, the project also destroyed wetlands by filling them 
with rock and earth. The Miraflores dump, located between the Cardenas river and the 
railroad track, reclaimed the land upon which fort Clayton was built.164  
Through the Rio Grande’s middle and lower course, floodlands predominated, 
especially alluvial lands that had been historically used for livestock and tropical market 
agriculture. American environmental ethics brought a different regime of land-use, felt 
particularly by the transit region’s wetlands and mangrove forests. Representations of 
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vapor-emanating marshes rife with rotting vegetation had left a deep imprint in the 
American environmental imaginary.  Although the germ theory of disease was gaining 
acceptance in the transnational scientific community, Stine argues, “the wetlands 
themselves remained under a cloud of suspicion.”165 The mosquito theory raised new 
doubts about the healthfulness of insect-breeding swamps, further associating wetlands 
with pestilence. While cases of bad science producing appropriate or sustainable 
environmental practice and engineering have been recorded, the intersection of medicinal 
and hydraulic knowledges, in this instance, reinforced older, harmful attitudes toward life 
sustaining ecosystems. 
The Rio Grande’s marshy lower basin would receive the bulk of the spoil from the 
excavations at the continental divide. The tropical estuary located at the river’s mouth, La 
Boca, allowed tidewater into the lower basin. The general consensus among engineers of 
the period was that filling these marshlands was the most effective way of building the 
waterway. A series of landfills, embankments, and dredge-work in the Pacific coast 
completely transformed the estuary of the mouth of the Rio Grande, creating a single 
channel. The tortuous course of the river was widened and straightened, strategically 
submerging “the deadly swamps of the Rio Grande back of Panama.” With little effort, 
Bates boasted, and “less than a million of money,” the I.C.C. could “transform these 
breeders of otherwise unconquerable Chagres fever and malaria into the bed of a clear, 
fresh lake, and the death-giving morasses would be replaced by life-giving waters.”166 
Moreover, these wetland could be further converted into hydraulic resources, “the 
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mangrove thickets afford[ing] splendid material for fascine mattresses in connection with 
dyke and harbor works.” 167  
In the lower Rio Grande, the central destination for debris was the landfill that 
would become the town of Balboa, the imperial showcase and administration capital, 
west of Panama City. Bates lauded the decision to reclaim land in the area, since it 
“add[ed] to the domain of the zone, affording a new and better located and ideally 
sanitary site immediately adjacent to and seaward from the present town.”168 However, 
these new town would by no means be an extension of dangerous, tropical Panama City, 
but would be a city fit for white civilization to enjoy the benefits of having conquered 
nature. The transformation of the waterscapes was followed by radical changes on the 
Canal Zone’s urban landscaping and forestry. The Rio Grande’s mouth would host white, 
gold-roll Balboa and a silver quarter town called La Boca.  Two other military 
fortifications were built to ‘secure’ the Pacific port and locks in reclaimed coastal areas: 
Fort Amador and Albrook Air Force Station. 
In addition to the connection established between the coastal islands and Balboa, 
the history of the Rio Grande had been effectively married to the Rio Chagres’s. The 
Zone’s hydrology would suffer a new major transgression in the name of the everlasting 
search for water sources. Population pressures on water demands and a long drought 
extending from 1929 to 1930 acted as the main motivations to secure new sources of 
water for the storage needs of the watershed.169 Panama City’s metropolitan area 
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population in 1905, the second year of construction, stood at 22,000.170 In 1922, U.S. 
President Calvin Coolidge authorized the creation of a second dam and reservoir on the 
Rio Chagres, utilizing its tributary known as Alajuela in its upper basin. Madden lake, 
currently known as Alajuela lake, was completed in 1936 after the completion of Madden 
dam, and the area of 22 square miles it occupies were expropriated from Panama, again 
under the terms of the 1903 treaty.171 Despite this expansion of storage capacity, the 
political control of waterworks and distribution systems remained a point of contention 
for U.S.-Panama relations. 
A new form of American tropical landscape design and urbanism was shaped in 
this colonial encounter with Panama’s ecosystems. The influence of landscape architects 
William Lyman Phillips, the pioneer of tropical landscaping, and Frederick Law Olmsted 
Jr. determined the aesthetics of Zonian planning for decades after the construction period. 
The Zone’s verdant urbanism was a synthesis that anticipated greenbelt towns of the U.S. 
in the 1930’s, while adapting to the tropics contemporary urban tendencies associated 
with the City Beautiful Movement.172 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, a new variant to the philosophy of American forest management was also being 
shaped in overseas colonies, and might have played a role in the treatment of non-
urbanized spaces.173 However, there was an imperative to urbanize as little of the Zone as 
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possible, per George Goethals’s request, suggesting that forested lands better served the 
imperial mission for their defensive properties against terrestrial attacks.174 Although the 
surviving forests of the watershed might seem to attest to a successful nature 
conservation scheme, these forests were by no means natural. New species were imported 
from elsewhere in the Neotropics, including Asia and Africa, and drainage within urban 
and ‘forest’ areas was perfected to a point where waters never formed pools. 175  
As the U.S. got increasingly involved in the isthmus, as Julie Greene notes, 
“officials struggled to build a comfortable society for white Americans—one they might 
proudly call a civilization—in the zone.” The initial 100% turnover rate for American 
officials led to the importation of every luxury and comfort from the imperial metropole. 
The material inequality between the Zone’s paradisiacal Gold Roll quarters and its Silver 
Roll tenements rivaled the larger contrast between the transit enclave and urban Panama. 
The Zone benefited from the Canal’s hydropower, and Zonians enjoyed electricity before 
even many factories were electrified in the mainland U.S. 
Due to their close proximity to American territories, Panama City and Colon’s 
landscapes were sanitized, rivers and settlements were sprayed with pesticide, streets 
paved, houses fumigated, screened, and heightened, modern water and sewage systems 
installed, all in an imperial effort to “pull the teeth” out of the tropics.176 Ironically, the 
U.S. government demanded small payments from Panama for these projects, even if the 
I.C.C. deemed these “part of a bioterritorial effort to buffer white populations and 
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infrastructure from human and environmental threats that were, at least in part, 
byproducts of the construction of the canal itself.”177 Although Panama’s urban citizens 
along the transit region benefited from this spill-over of progressive American 
environmental management, the spatially unequal application of these health measures 
across the country exacerbated historic inequalities.  
Besides its separation from Panamanian ‘natives’ and its landscaping aesthetics, 
the Zone itself was segregated into a socio-racial hierarchy modeled after the Jim Crow 
system, reflecting the Silver Roll and Gold Roll binary. The silver label, used to 
designate “low-skill” and darker hues, denoted the medium used to pay most workers. 
White colonists, mostly bureaucratic Zonians, were remunerated in gold. This unequal 
system, which also segregated housing on the Canal Zone, created internal borderlands. 
As Michael Donoghue puts it, “The gold towns of Ancon, Balboa, and Diablo on the 
Pacific… evolved into sites of safety and comfort for white U.S. citizens. In their 
psychological geography such communities constituted Wilderesque ‘our towns’ rather 
than the silver towns of La Boca, Paraiso… that in their eyes denoted blackness, 
inferiority, and threat of crime.”178 In La Boca, the silver quarters were deliberately 
“hidden” from Balboa on the south side of Sosa hill. Balboa, built upon the largest 
landfill of the Canal Zone, was designed to epitomize the most progressive aspects of 
American civilization, with carefully manicured ocean drive-ways, a park and plaza 
system, and strategic port and harbor. Reese and Reese give us a glimpse of how the new 
commuting patterns in the former estuarine area worked out: 
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“Olmsted recommended that the new portion of the tramway line, which was planned to connect 
port facilities and Panama City be laid around the back of Sosa Hill… bring[ing] ‘native’ workers 
from the city and black workers from La Boca179 directly to their jobs without crossing Balboa’s 
Prado.”180 
In 1956, citing safety concerns due to its location next to the southern entrance of the 
canal and fuel storage tanks, the Zone authorities removed West Indians from La Boca. 
Sparing the “dangerous fuel tanks,” officials demolished old wood-and-screen housing, 
replacing the stock with concrete structures for white Zonians.  
Most of the settlements of the Canal Zone, however, were established after the 
violent depopulation order of 1912. Before this date the U.S. had embraced “a liberal 
policy toward rural settlement” and smallholders, evident in the surveys of agricultural 
potential conducted by Bennett. However, as construction works neared a close, this 
policy was reassessed. The U.S. exercised its legal right to expropriate land deemed 
necessary for “canal purposes” using force, legitimized through an eminent domain 
claim. This enclosure, as Carse deftly puts it, “marked the transition” of the Zone’s 
mission “from transportation as a socio-technical project that could mesh with, and even 
benefit from, agricultural land using the same region to a government project to produce 
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residential spaces to the isthmus for the first time. This rapidly spread to Panamanian cities. Reese and 
Reese, 188- 189. 
78 
 
a landscape that served narrowly defined purposes.”181 American technocrats considered 
that, within this new logic, “the new Zone ought to be a place that separates North 
Americans from Panama.”182 Following the construction phase, all “Antillean” workers 
were forced to abandon the Canal Zone. Panama City’s neighborhoods close to the 
former mouth of the Rio Grande, where Afro-Panamanians had settled since the second 
half of the nineteenth century, mushroomed into much denser slums. Wooden shacks 
became a fixture in places like El Chorrillo, Calidonia, and Marañon.183 These urban 
residents were effectively transferred from areas with Zonian-provided water services to 
Panama’s system of water and sewage services. 
Article II of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty specifically granted “the United States 
in perpetuity… the group of small islands in the Bay of Panama, named, Perico, Naos,  
and Flamenco.” These islands were virtually annexed to the coast via a breakwater and 
causeway constructed from rock and debris of excavations. This took the form of a 
causeway meant to protect the entrance channel. This landform diverts crosscurrents that 
carry soft material from the shallow harbor of Panama City into the canal channel. The 
causeway linked the islands that had historically served as harbors for Panama City with 
the mainland Balboa, a complex known as the Causeway Islands of Amador.184  
 Conflicts over the use of hydrologic resources surfaced during the first half of the 
twentieth century, but the asymmetric power of the U.S. and its hegemonic control over 
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land and labor prevented democratic outcomes. In his nationalistic monograph on the 
history of the Rio Chagres, published at a time of climaxing tensions over the Canal 
Zone’s sovereignty, Bonifacio Pereira denounced the high prices charged by the U.S. to 
Panama for the provision of potable water and electric power. The purifying plant at 
Miraflores drew its water from Gatun Lake, which in turn drew most of its water from the 
newer Madden Lake. This interconnected system of sewer and aqueducts remained in 
American hands well into the Cold War. A similar arrangement was in place for the 
provision of hydroelectric energy.185 In response to recent threats by the Zone’s 
government to cut these services if Panama refused to pay maintenance tolls, Pereira 
exhorted the Panamanian government to build its own hydroelectric and purifying 
facilities to curb this dangerous dependency.186 Besides the outright control of the Zone’s 
space and appropriation of the waterway’s profits, the Panama Canal imposed myriad 
structural limitations on Panamanian sovereignty and prosperity that even today are not 
fully understood.   
Even after its symbolic opening in 1914, the functioning of the Panama Canal 
entails, to the present day, a perpetual battle against nature, taking the form unending 
dredging and maintenance with heavy floating machinery. The persistence of mudslides, 
channel and storage sedimentation,187 prodigious rainfall seasons, and sprouts of water 
hyacinth necessitated permanent abatement. The narrow strait linking the Rio Chagres 
and Rio Grande was an elaborated artifice remade constantly. Near the Rio Grande’s 
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headwaters, the Panama Canal Dredging Division, one of the most important cogs of the 
canal’s infrastructures, was expanded and relocated to the town of Gamboa, close to the 
Continental Divide on the Chagres.188 As dredging superintendent John Claybourn 
justified the relocation to Canal Zone Governor Jay Morrow: “…first as a safeguard in 
case of obstruction of … [Culebra] Cut by slides, the logical location being between any 
dredging and the dumps in Gatun Lake; second [because] increased Canal traffic, as well 
as the size of the ships, introduces a serious menace to our fleet when moored in the… 
Cut at Paraiso.”189 
Panama’s continued efforts to revise the 1903 treaty finally yielded results with 
the advent of the U.S. Good Neighbor Policy and the signing of the 1936 Hull-Alfaro 
treaty. Not ratified until months before the outbreak of the war in 1939, this accord ended 
the protectorate-status of Panama, curbing unilateral intervention and the undisputed right 
to eminent domain practiced by Washington for thirty-six years. More important for 
Panamanian productive activity, commercial interests addressed the harmful smuggling 
of goods out of the Zone, and obtained access to the Zone’s previously forbidden market. 
The colonial enclave had effectively split the country in two, and this split was evident in 
food supply networks. Hence, in a stereotypical banana republic and U.S. client-state, the 
fruit that was consumed in the capital, and logically within the Zone, was being imported 
from abroad.190 Nonetheless, calls for Panamanian sovereignty and for truly bilateral 
approaches to treaty renegotiations were ignored, failing to prevent some of the worst 
socioecological follies perpetrated by the U.S. in Panama in ensuing years.  
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The domination of the isthmus’s tropical ecology and polity virtually granted the 
U.S. free rein to experiment with environmental racism and pursue its imperial interests 
unimpeded. As John Lindsay-Polland notes, “Prevailing U.S. attitudes toward the tropical 
environment, civilization, and race served to rationalize the ways in which the United 
States pursued its objectives.”191 He chronicles different episodes of American abuse of 
the Canal Zone. Among these uses of tropical ecology, he lists clandestine environmental 
activities, covert chemical weapons tests, and Cold War training for tropical guerrilla 
counterinsurgency.192 Although less obvious than the long-term effect of controlling the 
hydraulic infrastructure, these episodes altered the country’s political ecology in myriad 
ways, some of which persist into the present-day. 
The politics behind the unification of the watersheds of the Rio Grande and the 
Rio Chagres had a determining effect on the conditions of urbanization in the transit 
region. At either end of the interoceanic corridor, the presence of the Canal Zone blocked 
the possibility of a natural suburbanization south of Colon and north of Panama City. 
Except for the physical and political boundary posed by the Zone, as Donoghue puts it, 
“urban expansion would have spread out like a concentric fan from these coastal ports. 
Instead the boundaries of the Zone forced development to the east and west of Panama 
City and Colon,” and in the case of the capital on the Pacific, “creating an elongated 
metropolis… that still plagues its residents to this day.” Moreover, “the results fostered a 
lightly populated Canal Zone with very dense Panamanian populations at either end of 
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the enclave.” This “peculiarly warped urban development pattern,”193 especially in the 
Pacific where Panama City’s ecological footprint has grown irreversibly, resulted in the 
severe environmental deterioration of rivers and potential water resources in the capital’s 
historic hinterland.194 
The main environmental problems threatening prospects for sustainable 
development in Panama derive from the destructive expansion of the cattle ranching 
frontier.195 A staple of the local economy since the days of the Spanish colonial corridor,  
The livestock sector was able to exploit a wealthy new market after the restrictions on 
food imports were lifted with the aforementioned 1936 treaties, also known as the “meat 
and beer treaty.” In the eve of World War 2, Franklin Roosevelt authorized 50$ million 
dollars for construction works related to the defense of the canal, which generated the 
migration from rural Panamanians to the countryside to earn wages. The Canal Zone’s 
consumption drove the growth of the livestock industry in Panama’s interior, leading to 
accelerated deforestation in the rest of Panama. The spatial organization of the isthmus 
imposed by transitismo hinged on the one-dimensional transit sector and its heavily 
monopolized supporting activities, and this system was perpetuated by the establishment 
of the Canal Zone. Castro Herrera argues that “the presence of an ecologically sustainable 
enclave,” where technocrats foregrounded forest conservation and urban planning, 
“stimulated the tendency toward unsustainability that dominates the rest of Panama. 
Unsustainability … has built an ever tighter circle around the enclave of 
                                                          
193  Michael Donoghue, Borderland on the Isthmus, 24.  
194 More recently, the thirsty metropolis has started putting pressure and extracting resources from 
ecosystems increasingly farther away from the capital’s hinterland savannahs. This has resulted in the 
damming of rivers in other provinces and Indian comarcas, and the extraction of human and natural 
resources (rock and sand) from ‘interior’ regions destined for the ballooning transit region.   
195 Castro Herrera, Pro Mundi Beneficio, 146. 
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sustainability.”196 Following the War, the cattle ranching footprint in Panama began to 
expand significantly. In 1952, 85% of the Panama Canal watershed was forested, a vital 
part of the assemblage making up the transit economy. Although estimates vary, by 1983 
this ratio had descended to 30%.197  
The fact that the Panama Canal is a multiple lock canal built over a mountain 
range changed the waterway’s articulation with local water provision in qualitative 
ways.198 Every ship’s lockage, during which water is lost to the oceans at a rate of 
101,000 m3 per downward cycle, is a wasteful enterprise. In other words, about 52 
million gallons of freshwater are lost during each ship’s transit. If current developments 
continue, the water supply will not suffice to provide for central Panama’s citizen needs 
and to fuel interoceanic transit. Increasingly uncertain precipitation patterns have raised 
doubts about the Canal watershed’s, effectively the Rio Chagres’s basin, ability to 
support an expanded lock infrastructure and growing population. The transit region 
continues to rely heavily on electricity generated at hydroelectric plants in the canal’s 
watershed. Ironically, the canal and the surrounding urban areas share the freshwater 
reserves stored in the watershed’s reservoirs. Heckadon argues that “Because economic 
growth in the basin has been both haphazard and unplanned,” and one should add 
‘unequal,’ the deterioration of the Canal’s fragile, but immensely vital, watershed is 
almost inevitable. This process “threatens the very ability of the ecosystem to continue to 
                                                          
196 Lindsay Poland, Emperors in the Jungle, 201. 
197 In the 1980’s, fears concerning Canal Watershed deforestation resulted in the adoption of the model of 
transboundary watershed authority developed in the Great Depression era Tennessee Valley Authority 
(T.V.A.). The TVA managed the Tennessee River watershed for navigation, flood control, power 
generation, and economic and social development; however, its model for that “bounded watershed… 
traveled to Europe, Asia, and Latin America.” The model came to Panama in the 1980’s, the same decade 
that saw the establishment of official national parks in the Chagres’s headwaters in an effort to protect 
the watershed forests and storage basins from campesino cutting. Carse, Beyond the Big Ditch, 50.  
198 It is worth noting that these figures only reflect the original Panama Canal lockages, and does not 
account for the additional functioning of the third set of locks, set to start operating in 2017.   
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produce and store fresh water in sufficient quantity and quality to meet the enormous 
demands that will be placed upon it.”199  
The canal’s planning and execution was carried ignoring the political, economic, 
human, and environmental realities that had existed in the transit area. Americans, more 
so than the French, saw in the isthmus, a tropical palimpsest for the application of 
revolutionary mechanical and energy advancements. This tabula rasa mentality was 
reminiscent of earlier treatment of native and imported labor, and reflected the attitudes 
toward tropical peoples forged by the currents of environmental determinism and 
scientific racism common during the New Imperialism period (c. 1880s – 1914). 
Retroactively, it is safe to assert, that the lock-based waterway’s design entailed 
transformations of such scale and impact that, according to Lindsay-Polland, “it is 
doubtful' that the Canal would have been constructed under the current requirements of 
US environmental legislation.”200 
In the Rio Grande valley, albeit to a lesser scale than in the Chagres’s, the 
environmental cost in ecological resilience and biodiversity was devastating.  The 
Chagres river basin had been the home of independent communities of black and mestizo 
farmers that harkened back centuries. Although ever changing and affected by a plethora 
of variables, their lifestyles were better attuned to nature, dependent upon subsistence 
plus polycultures, employing variety of age-honed methods and crops, where small 
domestic plots were the main productive units. Unconnected to distant markets or foreign 
capital, local barter economies had functioned for centuries to provide non-local 
necessities. These populations were forcibly quarantined from the Zone, under racist 
                                                          
199 Stanley Heckadon Moreno. “Impact of Development on the Panama Canal Environment,” 13. 
200 Castro Herrera, Isthmus in the World (2008), 41. 
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notions of environmental determinism and medicine. Frenkel notes that, starting in the 
construction period and evident in planning documents, the I.C.C. “semantically (and 
later literally) depeopled the future Canal Zone, homogenizing it in their descriptions as a 
vast ‘jungle’.”201 Cartographic representations of the Zone’s space played a major role in 
removing the forest peoples inhabiting the transit region from the technocratic and 
















                                                          
201 Stephen Frenkel, “Geographical Representations of the «Other»: The Landscape of the Panama Canal 
Zone,” Journal of Historical Geography 28, no. 1 (2002), 90. 




 The results of this thesis support the study of longue durée environmental change 
based on ecological materialism proposed by environmental historians such as Jason 
Moore. The history of human-driven impacts on terrestrial ecosystems of the isthmus of 
Panama contains episodes of scattered throughout millennia. Nonetheless, the 
intensification of environmental change in the last five centuries reflects this global 
pattern of worsening rifts in social metabolism. Although certainly not a linear process, 
the importation of technologies, and accompanying cultures, developed in Europe and the 
North Temperate Zone resulted in the acceleration of environmental degradation starting 
with the Conquest. The development of an interoceanic corridor and the subsequent 
monopolization and industrialization of transisthmian transit reinforce Moore’s thesis for 
understanding the reproduction and spatial properties of global resource frontiers.  
There have existed competing routes for much of its history, but prior to paved 
highways and cars, the width of the isthmus rendered those routes unviable when 
compared to the one running through Central Panama. The isthmus’ dependence on 
transit and its historic fetish by the elements of society that controlled its role in the world 
system had the biggest impact on Panamanian ecosystems of all other productive 
activities or ideals. The unique geography of this East-Central area would condemn it to 
depend on global trade patterns and economics to define its leitmotif. This mode of 
production – the facilitating of transit of goods, people, and capital across its strategic 
jurisdiction – was inherently disconnected from the soil and land, thus it was socially and 
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ecologically unsustainable. The recent expansion of the Panama Canal was conceived 
within a culture of nature that did not eschew the mechanistic and domination-driven 
attitudes toward non-human nature imposed by a century of U.S. control. 
Besides Moore’s model of world-ecology, the history of the Rio Grande 
illuminates some of the critical turning points in the water history of Panama’s transit 
region and, in turn, sheds light on the problematic environmental history of transitismo as 
a mentality, one responsible for shaping modes of social and territorial organization and 
determining the country’s collective relation to nature. The evolution of local 
environmental change, and attitudes toward nature, needs to be understood within a 
dialectical view of European expansion through resource frontiers whose landscapes 
constitute conditions as well as consequences of this expansion. Transitismo determined 
the nature of Panama’s insertion into the emerging world market and ecological system 
during the sixteenth century, and proved to be the main driver of environmental change 
and resource use ever since. The transit-dependent mentality was chiefly responsible for 
the industrialization of the interoceanic route, and thus of the structural problems derived 
from it. Thus, as Castro Herrera argues, a history of the environmental impact of 
transitismo mentalities becomes, by definition, an environmental history of Panama.  
Shortly after conjuring the independence of Panama and gaining sovereign rights 
over the Rio Grande’s territory, the US Army Corps molded the Rio Grande to decant the 
water of the mighty Caribbean Rio Chagres into the Pacific. Rather than a big ditch, the 
Panama Canal is, as Jaén Suárez notes, a river that drains into two seas. In order to fulfill 
88 
 
the much prophesied goal of connecting the world’s oceans, however, nature had to be 
transformed and harnessed to an unprecedented degree and scale. In the 1900s, pragmatic 
U.S. engineers decided upon a lock-based canal that relied on the natural watershed to 
provide freshwater for the functioning of the locks.  
 When the Panama Canal Review reported the disappearance of the Rio Grande 
following a sudden transformation of its upstream river bed, it had already been rendered 
an insignificant current. By 1955, not only was the waterscape transformed by relatively 
large reservoirs, but the valley itself had been refashioned by dredging and embankments. 
The environmental journalist offered a triumphalist view of the past glories of the river to 
legitimize and naturalize the position of the colonizers in the landscape. However, the 
fact that the journalist does not report the largest transgression on the river’s integrity, its 
impoundment to create Miraflores Lake, reveals how dangerous can selective memories 
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